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IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE APPOINTMENTS OF JOHN G. ROBERTS AND
SAMUEL A. ALITO TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND
THEIR IMPACT ON AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
Alberto R. Gonzales*
ABSTRACT
During 2005, President George W. Bush appointed Federal Circuit Court Judges
John G. Roberts and Samuel A. Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court. These appointments
were the culmination of years of examination of the work, character, and temperament
of both men commencing during the 2000 presidential transition. Our evaluation in-
cluded face-to-face interviews; an analysis of judicial opinions, speeches, and writings;
and conversation with friends, colleagues, and court experts. Based on this work, a
select group of Bush Administration officials developed a set of predictors that formed
the basis of our recommendation to President Bush that he elevate Circuit Court
Judges Roberts and Alito to the Supreme Court. This Article explains how Judges
Roberts and Alito were evaluated, and our assessment of how they would perform
on the Court. The Article then examines whether the Bush Administration correctly
predicted how these two men would decide cases before the Court by reviewing some
of their most significant opinions to date.
We begin with an explanation of the process used in developing our recommen-
dation to the President followed by a thorough examination of the factors we weighed
(such as political considerations and confirmation challenges). The Article includes
a thorough, though certainly not exhaustive, review of the circuit court opinions of
each man. This early body of work is then compared to their most recent work on the
Supreme Court in certain key areas of the law. There is a remarkable, though not un-
expected, consistency between Justices Roberts’s and Alito’s jurisprudence on the cir-
cuit courts and on the Supreme Court. Based on this comparison, the Article concludes
that the Bush Administration successfully anticipated that Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito would decide cases using a consistent set of principles including judicial
restraint, respect for precedent, and statutory interpretation based on plain language.
* Former Counsel to the President and U.S. Attorney General under the George W. Bush
Administration. Before joining the Bush Administration in Washington, D.C., he served as
Governor George W. Bush’s General Counsel, the Texas Secretary of State, and was later ap-
pointed to the Texas Supreme Court. He is currently the Doyle Rogers Distinguished Chair of
Law at Belmont University College of Law, and Counsel at the Nashville law firm of Waller
Lansden. The author thanks Christine Oberholtzer (J.D. Candidate 2014, Belmont University
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INTRODUCTION
There are many decisions and events that define a presidency. Sometimes a
president is defined by his response to an attack on American soil, such as Pearl
Harbor or September 11th. A president’s legacy has also been shaped by the manner
in which he leads the country through a crisis like the Great Depression, or serves as
Commander-in-Chief during a world war. One type of decision that receives too little
public attention, but which often represents a president’s most enduring legacy, is a
president’s appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court. Because the U.S. Constitution
provides federal judges life tenure,1 appointees serve well beyond the term of the
president who appointed them, and their decisions will affect the lives of Americans
spanning over several administrations. Although unelected, the votes of the members
of the Court often do affect the policy decisions of the elected branches. On matters
of constitutional questions, absent a subsequent contrary constitutional amendment
or a change in the majority make-up of the Court, these decisions on law and policy
by the Court are final and binding.2
Every administration approaches Supreme Court nominations differently. President
George W. Bush, understanding their importance, directed me in early 2001, as White
House Counsel, to develop a list of potential nominees in anticipation of a vacancy.
After consulting with some of my predecessors in the White House, my team of
lawyers in the Counsel’s Office institutionalized a formal selection process. Relying
in part upon that process, President Bush nominated Judges John G. Roberts and
Samuel A. Alito to the Supreme Court in 2005. This Article describes the nomina-
tion process employed by the Bush Administration and examines the reasons for the
Roberts and Alito nominations. Next, the Article describes our expectations in 2005
for both men as members of the Supreme Court. Finally, the Article examines the
most significant of their Supreme Court opinions, and compares those to the expecta-
tions of the Bush Administration. Based on that comparison, the Article concludes
that the Bush White House was successful in predicting how Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito would decide cases before the Supreme Court. As a result, one can
argue that President Bush achieved his objective of nominating judges who would
consistently decide cases based on a conservative set of principles, thus placing the
jurisprudence of the Court on a conservative path for future generations.
I. THE NOMINATION PROCESS
A. Expectations of the President
During the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate George W. Bush promised the
American people that if elected president, he would nominate strict constructionists
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958).
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to the U.S. Supreme Court—jurists in the mold of Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas.3 After his election, President Bush conveyed to me his commit-
ment to keep his promise to the American people. As the incoming White House
Counsel, the President looked to me to work with Attorney General John Ashcroft to
identify potential nominees.
The President also made clear to me that he wanted to avoid surprises. He wanted
reliable conservatives—individuals with a track record adhering to a conservative
judicial philosophy. On more than one occasion, I heard him make reference to his
father’s nomination of Justice David Souter. Although appointed by a Republican
president, Justice Souter had become one of the more liberal members of the Court.4
The President’s disappointment with regard to that appointment was evident to me.
I often reminded President Bush there were no guarantees or sure things with respect
to these appointments, but assured him that we would be disciplined in vetting candi-
dates and recommending only those individuals who in our judgment would exercise
a conservative judicial philosophy.
B. Mechanics of the Selection Process
Presidents throughout our history have employed various methods to decide
appointments to the Court.5 Some have been very involved personally in evaluating
and selecting candidates, while others much less.6 Although he considered these ap-
pointments very important, President Bush never ordered or directed a formal process.
However, from time to time he asked about our progress in developing a list of can-
didates, and he appeared satisfied with my explanation of both the method and scope
of our review. When sifting through the names of possible appointees and narrowing
the list to a handful of serious contenders, we weighed both informal assessments
as well as formal evaluations.
1. Pre-Vacancy: Informal Process
Throughout President Bush’s first term, he and I had many conversations about
judges and filling a Supreme Court vacancy. We had had similar conversations about
Texas Supreme Court Justices when he was Texas Governor and I served as his
General Counsel, but these White House discussions were far more serious and
frequent. Most were informal, one-on-one conversations in the Oval Office. The
3 See William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 391, 468 (2002).
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the
Appointment Clause, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1069–70 (1987); Joel K. Goldstein,
Choosing Justices: How Presidents Decide, 26 J.L. & POL. 425, 427–28 (2011).
6 Goldstein, supra note 5, at 474–75.
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President was not a lawyer, so we spent some time discussing certain styles of judg-
ing and, on a basic level, various principles of judging. I spoke with him about what
he wanted in a nominee and probed how he expected judges to decide cases. I asked
him whether he was willing to take on a tough confirmation fight. From time to time
he would inquire about the names at the top of my list and why. Sometimes he would
volunteer a name to me (confirming my suspicions that he received names from other
sources) and ask for my views. President Bush was fairly consistent in his expecta-
tions of his judicial appointees. Diversity was important, but a conservative judicial
philosophy was most important. His willingness to take on a major confirmation
fight varied depending on outside events or the President’s need to get congressional
support for an important part of the President’s policy.
In addition to my private conversations with the President, during my tenure as
White House Counsel, and then later as Attorney General, I reviewed binders of in-
formation, and considered a number of recommendations about potential candidates
from various individuals and organizations. Sometimes, unsolicited recommendations
were made by letter or email. Often I met with individuals or groups leaders to solicit
their views. During this fact-gathering process, there emerged fairly quickly a consen-
sus among legal experts, Court watchers, the media, and lawyers in my office regarding
a select group of federal circuit court judges as the leading candidates. I anticipated the
President would not only ask me about their judicial philosophy, but also my views of
each of them as a person, as a judge, and as a potential nominee. So I made it a point
to meet these judges and, time permitting, to get to know them. These meetings were
informal and private. Some occurred in my West Wing office, but other meetings took
place outside of the office. One such private meeting, now publicized,7 occurred at
the Justice Department with D.C. Circuit Judge John Roberts in 2005, after I had be-
come Attorney General. These private conversations helped me form an opinion of
each of these candidates. I, in turn, would share my views with the President.
2. Pre-Vacancy: Formal Process
At the beginning of the Bush administration in 2001, I tasked Brett Kavanaugh,
one of the Associate Counsels in the White House Counsel’s Office, to coordinate the
initial formal vetting of potential Supreme Court nominees. The work began with a
compilation of the names of men and women identified by the bar, media, friends, and
colleagues as qualified and conservative in their views, or known to be Republican
and conservative in their philosophy of judging. I directed that we cast a wide net and
leave no stone unturned to find potential nominees. The vetting list, which initially
numbered over one hundred, included current and former judges; current and former
7 See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, David Luban & Steven Lubet, Improper Advances, SLATE
(Aug. 17, 2005, 2:50 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence
/2005/08/improper_advances.single.html.
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members of Congress; current and former cabinet members, agency heads, law pro-
fessors, and university administrators; as well as distinguished members of the bar.
Each name was subjected to a preliminary vetting by lawyers in the Counsel’s Office
and a select group of lawyers at the Justice Department.
Some candidates had obvious confirmation challenges and were quickly elimi-
nated from further consideration. Others, we concluded, were not ready or simply not
qualified by virtue of experience or a background issue. Still others were disqualified
because of writings, speeches, judicial opinions, public editorials, or statements incon-
sistent with a conservative judicial philosophy. As a result of this preliminary vetting,
our initial list was shortened to approximately fifty names. These individuals were
then assigned to various lawyers in the Counsel’s Office and at the Department of
Justice, who were asked to do a more in-depth due diligence review, and to prepare
brief two-to-three page summaries.
Because there were no Supreme Court vacancies during President Bush’s first
term, we had ample time to vet candidates. Based on numerous discussions and our
review of these brief two-to-three page summaries, we narrowed our list down to
twenty names. The lawyers were again tasked to prepare more lengthy summaries—
in some cases over fifty pages—of these individuals, including a biographical exami-
nation, summaries of qualification and accomplishments, discussion of confirmation
issues, review of speeches, other written materials, and anything else that spoke to
or provided clues about that person’s philosophy of judging, including relevant legal
or judicial opinions.
3. Post-Vacancy
Early in the Bush Administration, lawyers in the Counsel’s Office had developed
a timeline and game plan to move the White House from the point of an announced
vacancy to the point of an announcement of a nominee. While the Chief of Staff
understood this work, it was never formally presented to the President. Consequently,
no formal procedure or plan was adopted by the White House in advance of a va-
cancy describing how final recommendations were to be developed and provided to
the President, although it was my understanding based on conversations with the
President and his Chief of Staff that the final vetting would be conducted by a small
group of senior Administration officials. In February 2005, I left the Counsel’s Office
and was appointed as Attorney General. A few months later, we learned that Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor intended to step down and the people chosen to make final
recommendations to the President for O’Connor’s successor included Vice President
Dick Cheney, Chief of Staff Andy Card, Senior Advisor Karl Rove, the new White
House Counsel Harriet Miers and me—the Attorney General.
Following Justice O’Connor’s announcement, our group met several times, usu-
ally in the Vice President’s West Wing office, reviewing the summaries prepared by
the Department of Justice and the Counsel’s office. Based on those discussions, the
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group decided initially to interview four individuals: Fourth Circuit Judge Mike Luttig,
Second Circuit Judge Samuel A. Alito, Fourth Circuit Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III,
and D.C. Circuit Judge John J. Roberts. Judges Luttig, Wilkinson, and Alito were vet-
eran judges, respected and accomplished. It would surprise few serious Court watchers
that we had decided to move forward and interview them. On the other hand, although
he was a highly regarded appellate lawyer, I had not considered John Roberts as one
of the early favorites. However, after his appointment to the D.C. Circuit, Judge
Roberts’s performance confirmed that he deserved to be on our short list of candidates.
In order to try to minimize publicity about who we were considering and to avoid
leaks about the interviews in the weeks after the O’Connor announcement, each judge
met secretly with our group of five for about forty-five minutes in the residence of the
Vice President at the Naval Observatory.
In those interviews, each candidate was asked a common set of questions, as well
as questions unique to their personal circumstances and experiences. Because of my
position as Attorney General, and all of the work I had done over four years as White
House Counsel to prepare for a vacancy, the group deferred to me in taking the lead
in asking questions. Harriet Miers also asked questions, but, not surprisingly, relatively
little was asked by the other three members (none of whom were lawyers). Most of the
discussions with the candidates related to their judicial philosophy. After each inter-
view, our group quickly debriefed before moving on to the next interview. Following
the four interviews, we huddled, and after some deliberation, decided who to recom-
mend that the President interview.
4. Factors in the Selection Process
Based on my conversations with President Bush and my experiences on the Texas
Supreme Court, I had a clear vision regarding the type of person I would recommend
to the President. I approached the job of developing a short list of candidates in a
methodical, straightforward manner. Other members of the selection group may have
looked at different factors or placed greater weight on one or more of these factors.
Interestingly, however, despite these possible differences in evaluating candidates for
the Court, there was almost universal agreement amongst the members of the group
on the final ranking of the candidates we interviewed.
First, I looked at qualifications. Was this a person of professional excellence and
high achievement? Was this person capable of handling the job by virtue of his or
her education, skills, and experience? How would the nominee be rated by the bar
associations? Is this someone I would be proud to have standing by the President at
a Rose Garden or East Room announcement?
Second, I looked at the personal qualities of the candidates such as character,
courage, and discipline. Does this person have the character to stand up to the un-
imaginable scrutiny of the nomination process and the difficult questioning in a con-
firmation hearing? Does he or she have the courage to do the right thing in applying
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the law, no matter how unpopular or contrary to the nominee’s personal biases and
views? Is the person strong enough to withstand criticism of his or her decisions? Will
the person be influenced by accusations—justified or not—of judicial activism? Does
the nominee have the discipline to apply a consistent set of principles in deciding cases
over a period of ten, twenty, or thirty years and not be seduced by the siren call of the
legal elites in the bar and academia to do that which is popular or politically correct?
Third, I looked at confirmability. Did the President’s party control the Senate?
Did we have the fifty-one votes necessary to confirm this nominee? Who, and how
influential and experienced, was the Senate Judiciary Chairman? Was the President
trying to fill a seat considered a swing vote on the Court? For example, was this a va-
cancy in the O’Connor or Kennedy seat, where an appointment by a conservative or
liberal President might tip the balance of the Court? Was this a nominee who had
executive branch experience and had authored privileged executive branch memos
that the Senate would demand to see? Would this nomination result in an institutional
fight between the Senate and the White House over such documents, and was the
President strong enough politically to win that fight? Was this nominee, this seat,
worth the fight?
Fourth, I looked at intangibles and political considerations. President Bush cared
about gender and racial diversity in our courts. For example, after the death of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and the nomination of Judge Roberts to the Rehnquist vacancy, the
President wanted to fill the O’Connor vacancy in 2005 with a qualified woman—thus
the Harriet Miers nomination.8 I did not take into account geographic or educational
diversity; however, I did take into account the nominee’s age. I looked for someone old
enough to have the wisdom and maturity that comes from life’s experiences, but young
enough to serve on the Court for thirty to forty years and impact the jurisprudence of
our country. Consequently, I also considered the health of a potential nominee.
Fifth, and most important, was the judicial philosophy of a potential nominee—
the processes used by a judge to interpret our Constitution and the laws passed by
Congress. I looked for individuals who based their constitutional interpretation on the
original intent of the Framers, if at all discernible; who did not believe the Commerce
Clause9 and the doctrine of preemption10 were intended, nor should be used, to allow
federal involvement in every aspect of our lives; who understood that the Constitution
8 President Bush nominated Miers on October 3, 2005, to fill the vacancy left on the
Court by Justice O’Connor. See Bush Picks White House Counsel for Supreme Court, CNN
(Oct. 4, 2005, 8:07 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/03/scotus.miers/. On
October 27, 2005, President Bush withdrew Miers’s nomination at her request. See Miers
Withdraws Nomination, FOX NEWS (Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005
/10/27/miers-withdraws-nomination/. Miers stated she was “concerned that the confirmation
process presents a burden for the White House and our staff that is not in the best interest of
the country.” Id.
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10 See, e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77–78 (2008) (discussing the doctrine
of preemption); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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is a limited document by design, and that not all issues should be constitutionalized
and taken out of the hands of our elected leaders. In doing so, that judge would
strengthen respect for the judiciary, uphold the rule of law, and permit the people—
through their elected representatives—to make choices about the issues of the day.
I did not think it appropriate to ask about a candidate’s personal or political views.
Because we expected judges to set them aside, we considered these views irrelevant.
Of course, to set aside personal and political views and rule according to the law is not
always easy, especially on those cases of national interest and in times of crises. All
judges will be tempted to abandon judicial philosophy on cases of personal importance
to them. The good ones resist. Indeed, the good ones will apply a misguided law as it
exists and trust democracy to fix that law. Applying all of these factors, I felt com-
fortable recommending Judges Roberts and Alito to the President.
II. OUR EXPECTATIONS: EVALUATION OF CIRCUIT JUDGE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR.11
A. Qualifications and Confirmation Considerations
By virtually every measure, save perhaps one, we considered Judge John G.
Roberts, Jr. uniquely qualified to serve on the Supreme Court. Roberts graduated
from Harvard College in 1976 and Harvard Law School in 1979.12 Following law
school, he clerked with Judge Henry J. Friendly of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit from 1979 to 1980.13 Following his year with Judge Friendly, Roberts
clerked for then–Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist on the U.S. Supreme Court
from 1980 to 1981.14 After completing his second clerkship, Roberts joined the
Reagan Administration as Special Assistant to Attorney General William French
Smith from 1981 to 1982.15 He then left the Justice Department to take on a position
as Associate Counsel to the President from 1982 to 1986.16
Roberts left the White House in 1986 to enter private practice as an appellate law-
yer at Hogan & Hartson.17 Roberts resigned his partnership at Hogan to accept an
11 Some of the material in this Part is based on the work of White House and Department
of Justice attorneys, or reflected in partial drafts of internal memorandums as well as the per-
sonal notes of the author.
12 Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) [hereinafter
Biographies of Current Justices].
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Judicial Nominations: Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., WHITE HOUSE, http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/judicialnominees/roberts.html (last visited
Mar. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Judicial Nominations: Chief Justice Roberts].
16 Biographies of the Current Justices, supra note 12.
17 Judicial Nominations: Chief Justice Roberts, supra note 15.
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appointment as Principal Deputy Solicitor General in the Administration of President
George H.W. Bush from 1989 to 1993.18 In 1992, President George H.W. Bush nomi-
nated Roberts for appointment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.19
The Senate took no action on the nomination, and with the change in administrations
in 1993, Roberts resigned from the Solicitor General’s Office and returned to Hogan
& Hartson.20
In May 2001, President George W. Bush nominated Roberts for a seat on the
D.C. Circuit.21 He was confirmed by a voice vote on May 8, 2003.22 Judge Roberts’s
judicial record, while solidly conservative, was quite limited. However, he was consid-
ered one of the best appellate lawyers in the country, was well respected in the elite
D.C. bar, and was supported by lawyers on both sides of the political aisle. The fact
that he had a limited judicial record presented a political challenge to the President’s
opponents because there was little paper trail to attack. Consequently, we in the White
House anticipated Judge Roberts would be challenged for his work in the executive
branch. We worried about Judge Roberts’s internal memos as a former executive
branch official, and the possibility of an institutional fight over access to these docu-
ments. Fortunately, after hurriedly reviewing available records at the National Archives
and at the Reagan Presidential Library, we concluded there was little in those records
to provide ammunition for the opposition.
B. Jurisprudence
Although Judge Roberts had served for only two years on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, his written opinions were clear, concise, and displayed
impressive powers of legal analysis and were characterized by faithful application of
precedent, fidelity to statutory text, and willingness to draw on common sense and
plain speak. We concluded that all of this validated his stated adherence to principles
of judicial restraint. Our review of his opinions indicated a readiness to limit federal
regulation on Commerce Clause grounds, a tendency to defer broadly to the elected
branches and to the discretion accorded to administrative agencies as to policy mat-
ters, as well as a less-deferential posture toward case-specific agency rulings.
1. Commerce Clause
Judge Roberts had written only one opinion dealing with Commerce Clause





22 Judicial Nominations and Confirmations: 108th Congress, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/108thCongress.cfm (last
visited Mar. 2, 2014).
23 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (denial of rehearing en banc).
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rehearing en banc in a Commerce Clause challenge to Fish and Wildlife Service
regulations that protected endangered toads by halting a construction project that re-
stricted the toads’ movements.24 The circuit panel upheld the regulation on Commerce
Clause grounds, finding that the regulation itself affected interstate commerce by af-
fecting commercial development.25 Judge Roberts dissented from denial of rehearing
en banc, saying that the panel explanation seemed inconsistent with United States
v. Lopez26 and United States v. Morrison,27 each of which struck down federal laws
that in particular applications might have regulated activities constituting interstate
commerce.28 Judge Roberts wrote that the appropriate question was not whether regu-
lation substantially affects interstate commerce, but whether the activity being regulated
does so.29 This suggested an inclination to decide that, notwithstanding the regulation’s
limitations on commercial activity, the degree of the toads’ habitat within a single state
removed the interstate element and failed to support the government’s actions on
Commerce Clause grounds. We viewed this position as consistent with the most recent
Supreme Court precedent in this area, and as evidence of Judge Roberts’s fidelity to
the principle of stare decisis for the circuit courts.
2. Fourth Amendment
Judge Roberts had only authored two opinions of note dealing with privacy
violations in the Fourth Amendment context. Both cases evidenced Judge Roberts’s
faithfulness to precedent and unwillingness to expand privacy rights.
In Stewart v. Evans,30 a government employee maintained in her government
office a file that included documents relating to a discrimination complaint she had
filed against the then–Inspector General of the Department of Commerce.31 When
Congress requested documents regarding the Inspector General, the plaintiff wanted
to cooperate, but did not want department lawyers reviewing her files.32 So, an external
team of Special Matters Unit (SMU) lawyers, who were responsible for responding
to the congressional request, reviewed the plaintiff’s files and agreed to deny access
to department personnel.33 Despite the arrangement, a department lawyer reviewed
her files that had been stored in a safe.34 The plaintiff sued, claiming the department
review was an unconstitutional search.35
24 Id. at 1160.
25 Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (circuit panel).
26 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
27 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
28 See Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160.
29 Id.
30 351 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
31 Id. at 1241.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1241–42.
35 Id. at 1242.
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Judge Roberts rejected the plaintiff’s claim, holding the plaintiff had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the documents because she had voluntarily provided them
to the SMU team.36 Judge Roberts believed it important that, because the plaintiff had
entrusted her documents to the SMU team to be reviewed for possible disclosure to
Congress, this defeated the plaintiff’s claim to privacy.37 Responding to the plaintiff’s
argument that the plaintiff had been assured that intra-department personnel access
to her documents would be restricted, Judge Roberts explained, “[t]he Fourth Amend-
ment protects privacy; it does not constitutionalize non-disclosure agreements.”38
In United States v. Holmes,39 the defendant moved to suppress evidence of a scale
used to weigh cocaine, discovered during a Terry stop.40 During a frisk of the defen-
dant, a police officer felt a hard object and, when asked, the suspect said it was a
scale.41 The officer testified he believed it was a scale, but nevertheless retrieved the
object.42 Although the officer’s subjective belief was that the object was not danger-
ous, Judge Roberts ruled that it was objectively reasonable to collect the object to
confirm that it was not dangerous.43 Judge Roberts found that the propriety of such
a search is judged only on the objective reasonableness of the officer’s actions.44
To those of us evaluating Judge Roberts, both cases appeared consistent with
precedent, but we believed critics could use these cases to characterize Judge Roberts
as hostile to privacy rights.
3. Equal Protection
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) created a preference for small
businesses in awarding broadcast licenses.45 This followed a D.C. Circuit panel strik-
ing down an FCC preference for minorities and female-owned businesses. In Sioux
Valley Rural Television v. FCC, Judge Roberts upheld the FCC preference that had
been challenged for perpetuating unconstitutional race and sex based preferences.46
Judge Roberts followed D.C. Circuit precedent to hold that, “the [FCC]’s consideration
of ‘the effect a rule change would have on minority- and women-owned businesses
does not evince its discriminatory intent.’”47 He accepted the FCC’s explanation that
36 Id. at 1243–44.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1244.
39 385 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
40 Id. at 787 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 788.
43 Id. at 790–91.
44 Id. at 790.
45 Sioux Valley Rural Television v. FCC, 349 F.3d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
46 Id. at 675.
47 Id. (quoting Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
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the revised rule promoted finality, avoided disruption in service, and promoted fair-
ness to the auction participants, who had relied in good faith on the preferences.48 The
Bush evaluation team believed opponents of race- or sex-based classifications might
criticize the deference shown to the FCC, but Judge Roberts’s approach appeared con-
sistent with restrained judicial decisionmaking.
In the highly publicized case of Hedgepeth v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority,49 Judge Roberts affirmed a grant of summary judgment dismiss-
ing a claim by a twelve-year-old girl who was arrested for eating a french fry in a
Washington, D.C. Metrorail station.50 She was charged because of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s zero-tolerance policy for food consumption
in the Metro, and because D.C. law does not allow non-traffic citations for minors.51
Consequently, minors who violated this policy had to be arrested.52 The girl brought
a claim, alleging the law discriminated against her because of her age.53 Although
Judge Roberts acknowledged this was an unfortunate event for a twelve-year-old
girl, he concluded, “[t]he question before us, however, is not whether these policies
were a bad idea, but whether they violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution.”54 Applying a rational-basis test, Judge Roberts concluded the policy
did not violate the Constitution because concerns about parental awareness and ac-
curate identification of juveniles are sufficient to meet rational-basis review.55 There
was significant public criticism of the arrest; prevailing opinion found it to be a silly
and ridiculous response to the actions of a twelve-year-old.56 We viewed Judge
Roberts’s decision as evidence that he would not be swayed by public opinion or
sentiment in deciding cases.
4. Due Process
In Bloch v. Powell,57 a returning foreign-service employee claimed he was denied
an immediate annuity without due process.58 Judge Roberts held the employee had no
constitutionally protected interest in receiving an immediate annuity.59 He found that
48 Id.
49 386 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
50 Id. at 1150.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1151.
54 Id. at 1150.
55 Id. at 1159.
56 See, e.g., Martin Weil, In D.C., Roberts Got Taste of National Spotlight, WASH. POST
(July 20, 2005), http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/19/AR2005071
902106.html.
57 348 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
58 Id. at 1062.
59 Id. at 1069.
2014] IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE 659
such benefits are provided with the consent of the Secretary of State.60 Finally, he
found that this broad grant of discretion to the Secretary defeated the employee’s right
to any protected interest in an immediate annuity.61 He went on to add that neither
department regulations nor prior decisions limited the Secretary’s discretion.62 While
this decision could be used to show Judge Roberts’s lack of concern for due process
rights, we believed it served as an example of appropriate deference to executive-
branch authority and discretion.
III. OUR EXPECTATIONS: EVALUATION OF CIRCUIT JUDGE SAMUEL A. ALITO
A. Qualifications and Confirmation Considerations
On paper, Samuel Alito’s experiences made him an even stronger candidate for the
Court than Judge Roberts. Alito graduated from Princeton University in 1972 and Yale
Law School in 1975.63 He clerked from 1976 to 1977 for Judge Leonard Garth of the
Third Circuit.64 Alito worked as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the appellate division
from 1977 to 1981.65 Starting in 1981, he worked for five years as an Assistant Solicitor
General at the Justice Department.66 From 1985 to 1987, he worked at the Justice
Department in the Office of Legal Counsel as Deputy Assistant Attorney General.67
In 1987, Alito was appointed and served as the U.S. Attorney for the District of
New Jersey.68 In 1990, President George H.W. Bush nominated him to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and he was unanimously confirmed to that court by
voice vote.69 At forty years of age, he was the second-youngest federal appeals court
judge in the country at that time.70
We believed that Alito was among the most qualified candidates in the country for
appointment to the Supreme Court. He was nearly fifty-five years old with extensive
60 Id. at 1068–69.
61 Id. at 1069.
62 Id.
63 John Fox, Biographies of the Robes: Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr., PBS, http://www.pbs
.org/wnet/supremecourt/future/robes_alito.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
64 Biographies of Current Justices, supra note 12.
65 Id.; Justice Alito Offers Lessons from the Bench—And a Distinguished Career, DUKE
L. NEWS (Oct. 1, 2013), http://law.duke.edu/news/justice-alito-offers-lessons-bench-and
-distinguished-career/ [hereinafter Justice Alito Offers Lessons].
66 Biographies of Current Justices, supra note 12.
67 Id.; Lives in the Law: Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Alito, DUKE L. NEWS (Sept. 15,
2010), http://law.duke.edu/news/5549/.
68 Biographies of Current Justices, supra note 12.
69 Samuel Alito Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 19, 2013, 5:18 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013
/02/03/us/samuel-alito-fast-facts.
70 Janet Hook, Richard B. Schmitt & Faye Fiore, A Phillies Fan with Blue-Chip Legal
Stats, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov/01/nation/na-profile1.
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and varied legal and judicial experience. His entire legal career had been spent han-
dling difficult and complex legal issues in the Solicitor General’s Office, the Office
of Legal Counsel, while serving as U.S. Attorney, and on the federal bench. He had
experience in both criminal and civil areas.
Not surprisingly, with a fifteen-year record on the bench, we anticipated there
would be criticism of some of Alito’s opinions. Judge Alito’s dissent from the Third
Circuit’s opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,71
where he argued that even the spousal notification provision should be upheld, was
a conservative position that the Supreme Court subsequently rejected.72 We also wor-
ried that his opinion in Fatin v. INS,73 in which he argued that an Iranian feminist’s
asylum petition should not be granted because she did not have a well-founded fear
of persecution upon deportation to Iran,74 would attract opposition from women’s
rights organizations. Additionally, we were concerned that his joining of the opinion
in Black ex rel. Black v. Indiana Area School District75 would cause critics to describe
him as showing insensitivity to the dangers of child molestation. Finally, we worried
about opposition from the criminal defense bar, because of Judge Alito’s knowledge
of and sympathy for practical issues facing law enforcement.76
B. Jurisprudence
Judge Alito had served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for
fifteen years and had authored hundreds of opinions. He had developed a reputation
as an intelligent and scholarly conservative judge. As a circuit court judge, his opin-
ions reflected fidelity with precedent. On questions of statutory construction, Judge
Alito generally relied first on the plain language of a statute.77 Many opinions reflected
an unwillingness to rely on legislative history,78 although he frequently discussed leg-
islative history as support for what he has clearly found the plain language to say.79
Judge Alito had also formerly served as a prosecutor, and his understanding of the
practical issues facing law enforcement officers were evident in some of his criminal
law opinions.
71 947 F.2d 682, 720 (3d Cir. 1991) (Alito, J., dissenting).
72 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
73 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
74 Id. at 1243.
75 985 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1993).
76 See, e.g., Doe v. Goody, 361 F.3d 232, 244–49 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J., dissenting).
77 Elliott M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation,
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 990–92 (2007).
78 See, e.g., Pa. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun, 228 F.3d 423, 426–28 (3d Cir. 2000).
79 See, e.g., Pa. Office of the Budget v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 996 F.2d 1505,
1509–11 (3d Cir. 1993).
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1. Commerce Clause
In United States v. Rybar,80 Rybar challenged a federal statute making it unlawful
for any person to purchase or transfer a machine gun, irrespective of any interstate
activity as an element of the crime.81 The majority rejected a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge and Judge Alito dissented, asking, “[W]as United States v. Lopez . . . a constitu-
tional freak? Or did it signify that the Commerce Clause still imposes some meaningful
limits on congressional power?”82 Judge Alito regarded this law as the “closest extant
relative of the statute struck down in Lopez. . . .”83 Both, he said, prohibit purely intra-
state activity, and neither was based on any congressional findings that the regulated
activity affects interstate commerce.84 Judge Alito was very critical of the majority for
in essence finding “that the private, purely intrastate possession of machine guns has
a substantial effect on the interstate machine gun market.”85 He posited that this theory,
if accepted, would go far toward converting Congress’s authority to regulate interstate
commerce into a “plenary police power. . . . [T]he majority’s theory leads to the con-
clusion that Congress may ban the purely intrastate possession of just about anything.
But if Lopez means anything, it is that Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause
must have some limits.”86
2. Equal Protection and Due Process
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,87 the Third Circuit
considered the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania law that required women be pro-
vided information twenty-four hours in advance of obtaining an abortion, a parental
notification requirement for minors, reporting requirements for abortion facilities,
and a requirement that a spouse be notified in advance of an abortion.88 The Third
Circuit upheld most of these provisions, but struck down the spousal notification re-
quirements as an unconstitutional burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion.89
The court considered the possibility that a husband might use violence or threats
of violence to prevent his wife from having an abortion, withhold financial support
to force his wife to refrain from having an abortion, or exploit the fact that his wife
is pregnant to shame her out of having an abortion.90 The majority concluded that
80 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1993).
81 Id. at 274.
82 Id. at 286 (Alito, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 287.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 291.
86 Id.
87 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
88 Id. at 687.
89 Id. at 687, 715.
90 Id. at 712.
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possible consequences such as these constituted an undue burden. Applying strict
scrutiny to the Pennsylvania statute, the Court held the spousal notification provi-
sion unconstitutional.91
Judge Alito, in dissent to the majority’s rendering of the spousal notification law
as unconstitutional, disagreed that the provision imposed an undue burden.92 Relying
on Justice O’Connor’s observation that a provision does not impose an undue burden
unless it affects a large number of women, Judge Alito found the plaintiffs had failed
to show how many women would be affected by the spousal notification provision.93
He observed that most wives inform their husbands, and unmarried women are not
subject to the requirement.94 In assuming that some percentage of women would even-
tually tell their husbands without substantial repercussions, Judge Alito concluded
that the spousal notification requirement would have an impact on abortions to some
degree, but not enough to constitute an undue burden.95
The Supreme Court heard the case and five Justices disagreed with Judge Alito,
holding that the spousal notification requirement did violate the liberty interest of the
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it imposed an
undue burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion.96
We predicted that the opinion would be a focus of controversy if Judge Alito were
to be nominated. It was controversial when written, and we anticipated that it would
be the focus for pro-choice organizations. The majority opinion was viewed as very
conservative and out of the mainstream by some, although the Supreme Court upheld
almost all of the Pennsylvania regulations.97 Judge Alito’s position was even more con-
servative, and he interpreted limits on the substantive due process rights of women in
a manner that a conservative Supreme Court ultimately rejected.98
In Pemberthy v. Beyer,99 Judge Alito held that the Equal Protection Clause does
not prohibit a prosecutor from peremptorily challenging jurors because of their abil-
ity to speak Spanish in a case where the evidence included material translated from
Spanish to English.100 Here the prosecutor argued that the translation would be a vital
part of the case and he feared Spanish-speaking jurors disputing the official transla-
tion and being a persuasive voice in the jury room because of their ability to speak
91 Id. at 715.
92 Id. at 719 (Alito, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Judge Alito concurred in
the rest of the opinion upholding the remainder of the Pennsylvania abortion provisions at
issue. Id.
93 Id. at 720–22 (citing Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 464
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
94 Id. at 722.
95 Id. at 723.
96 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
97 Id. at 833.
98 Casey, 947 F.2d at 719.
99 19 F.3d 857 (3d Cir. 1994).
100 Id. at 858.
2014] IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE 663
Spanish.101 The lower court found that striking Spanish-speaking jurors was tanta-
mount to striking them on the basis of their race, even though some of the Spanish-
speaking individuals struck were non-Hispanic.102
Judge Alito disagreed, finding language ability and ethnicity to not necessarily
coincide. He went on to conclude that language-based peremptory challenges are not
subject to the same degree of scrutiny as applied under Batson v. Kentucky103 to race-
based challenges.104 Although Judge Alito rejected strict or heightened scrutiny, he
cautioned trial judges to carefully assess a prosecutor’s actual motivation for making
a language-based challenge to ensure that the challenges are not motivated by race
or ethnicity.105
In Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer,106 the Third Circuit
considered the constitutionality of New Jersey’s partial-birth abortion statute.107 The
State of Nebraska had a very similar abortion statute that had been challenged.108 The
Third Circuit case was argued, and the majority opinion drafted, before the Supreme
Court issued its opinion on the constitutionality of the Nebraska statute in Stenberg v.
Carhart.109 The Supreme Court held the Nebraska statute unconstitutional.110
The Third Circuit held its opinion, however, until after Stenberg was decided.111
Seeing that nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Stenberg contradicted the
opinion the Third Circuit had already written, the Third Circuit issued its previously
written opinion without change and without discussing the Stenberg decision.112 Judge
Alito concurred in the judgment, but refused to join the court’s opinion because it
failed to discuss Stenberg.113 Understanding his role as a lower court judge to follow
precedent, he would have held simply that, because the New Jersey statute and the
Nebraska statute were virtually identical in material respects, the Third Circuit was
bound to follow the Stenberg precedent.114 We believed that Judge Alito was correct
in citing to Stenberg115 to remove any doubt as to the validity of the Third Circuit
position in light of that precedent.
101 Id. at 863.
102 Id.
103 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
104 Pemberthy, 19 F.3d at 870–71.
105 Id. at 873.
106 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000).
107 Id. at 130.
108 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. (decided June 28, 2000); Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (decided July 26, 2000).
112 Farmer, 220 F.3d at 127.
113 Id. at 152 (Alito, J., concurring).
114 Id.
115 Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914.
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The case of Phillips v. Borough of Keyport116 considered the constitutionality of
the Borough’s denial of zoning and construction permits to proprietors of adult book
and video stores on the basis of an adult entertainment user ordinance.117 Sitting en
banc, the Third Circuit held that the Borough had violated the plaintiff’s right to sub-
stantive due process.118 It found that where a state or local official had prevented or
punished constitutionally protected expression because of a distaste for the content
of that expression, that restriction violates the substantive due process clause unless
the action taken meets strict scrutiny.119
Judge Alito dissented in part, taking the Court to task for ignoring and not overrul-
ing a line of substantive due process cases in the Third Circuit on which the plaintiffs
had relied.120 He was critical of Bello v. Walker,121 which seemed to hold that sub-
stantive due process is violated whenever a government official who harbors some
improper motive deprives a person of certain property rights.122 The majority had
avoided determining whether Bello was correct by transforming the plaintiff’s due
process claim into a First Amendment claim and requiring them to show that the gov-
ernment official harbored an intent that was violative of the First Amendment.123 Judge
Alito would have preferred to overrule Bello and its progeny.124 In his view, these
cases had no support in Supreme Court precedent.125 We concurred in Judge Alito’s
direct and straightforward approach.
3. First Amendment: Religion
In C.H. v. Oliva,126 the plaintiff sued on behalf of her minor son, alleging that his
constitutional right to free expression had been violated by certain actions of public
school officials.127 First, his teacher asked each pupil to make a poster depicting what
he or she was thankful for.128 Plaintiff’s son drew a picture of Jesus.129 The picture was
116 107 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 1997).
117 Id. at 167–68.
118 Id. at 181.
119 Id. at 180.
120 Id. at 183–85 (Alito, J., dissenting).
121 840 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851, 488 U.S. 868 (1988) (holding
that municipal officials’ deliberate abuse of a constitutionally adequate procedure for the
purpose of denying a developer a building permit may violate due process rights, but that the
resultant delay did not constitute a taking).
122 See id.
123 Id. at 1124; Phillips, 107 F.3d at 184 (Alito, J., dissenting in part).
124 Phillips, 107 F.3d at 184.
125 Id. at 184–85.
126 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 915 (2001).
127 Id. at 204.
128 Id. at 201.
129 Id.
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posted in the hallway along with other students’ posters.130 A school official took the
poster down due to its religious content.131 The following day the poster was returned
to the hallway but placed in a less prominent location.132
The Third Circuit did not reach the merits, but found that some of the defen-
dants were immune from suit and remanded the case to allow amendment of the
pleadings with respect to the other defendants.133 Judge Alito criticized the majority
for raising procedural arguments that the parties had not raised and for avoiding the
First Amendment issue.134 He would have held that the plaintiff had alleged facts to
support a violation of the First Amendment based on discriminatory treatment of the
viewpoint expressed.135
In FOP v. City of Newark,136 Sunni Muslim police officers whose religion re-
quired them to wear beards brought a First Amendment challenge to a department
regulation requiring police officers to be clean shaven.137 The Police Department pro-
vided exemptions to this rule for officers required to wear beards for medical reasons,
but did not provide exceptions for religious reasons.138 Here, Judge Alito held the de-
partment policy to strict scrutiny and found the City had violated the free exercise
rights of Sunni Muslim police officers by refusing to grant them a religious exemption
from the Police Department’s no-beard policy when the City had granted exception
from the policy to officers who need to wear beards for medical reasons.139
4. First Amendment: Free Speech
In Saxe v. State College Area School District,140 the panel reviewed whether a
school district’s anti-discrimination policy violated the First Amendment.141 Judge Alito
found the policy, which prohibited harassment defined as “verbal or physical conduct
based on one’s actual or perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, disability or other personal characteristics,” to be unconstitutional.142
Here, students and their parents who felt compelled by their religion to speak out




133 Id. at 202–03.
134 Id. at 203 (Alito, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 214.
136 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
137 Id. at 360.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 367.
140 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
141 Id. at 202.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 203.
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Judge Alito reversed the district court, ruling that there is no categorical harass-
ment exception to the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.144 He also found that
the First Amendment protects deeply offensive speech that impugns another’s race or
that denigrates religious beliefs.145 He stated, “‘Harassing’ or discriminatory speech,
although evil and offensive, may be used to communicate ideas or emotions that
nevertheless implicate First Amendment protections.”146 Additionally, Judge Alito
held the policy to be overbroad because it prohibited speech that was not vulgar or
lewd, as well as a significant amount of core political and religious speech.147
In an earlier case, Edwards v. California University of Pennsylvania,148 Judge
Alito held that a public university can suspend a professor for refusing to adhere to
the school’s required curriculum.149 He found that the University, not the professor,
had the right to decide what is taught in the classroom.150 Thus, the content of the
speech in the classroom belonged to the University, not the professor. Finding the state
to be the speaker, Judge Alito held the state may “make content-based choices.”151
5. Fourth Amendment
The case of United States v. Kithcart152 involved an inmate appealing his con-
viction on the basis that the district court should have suppressed evidence obtained
by the police during a traffic stop.153 Following a robbery, police dispatchers described
the robbers as “two black males in a black sports car,” such as a Camaro.154 An hour
after the robbery, a police officer in a neighboring township noticed a black Nissan
driven by a black male.155 When the officer pulled up behind the Nissan stopped at a
red light, it drove through the light.156 The officer stopped the car and discovered fire-
arms in the vehicle.157 Judge Alito held there was no probable cause for the arrest and
search based on the imprecise vehicle match, the time lapse, and the lack of informa-
tion about the robbery.158 This case demonstrates that Judge Alito will rule against law
enforcement when there is a clear violation of the Constitution.
144 Id. at 204.
145 Id. at 206.
146 Id. at 209.
147 Id. at 217.
148 156 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 1998).
149 Id. at 489.
150 Id. at 491.
151 Id. at 492.
152 134 F.3d 529 (3d Cir. 1998).
153 Id.




158 Id. at 531–32.
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Showing a more sympathetic view toward law enforcement, Judge Alito held
federal marshals had not used excessive force while carrying out a court-ordered
eviction.159 Property owners had chased government officials off their property using
a truck and had threatened to shoot officers if they came onto their property.160 Be-
cause the property owners were known to possess firearms, federal officers carried out
the eviction with a shotgun and semiautomatic rifle.161 The property owners alleged
that marshals pointed guns in their faces, chests, and backs.162 Judge Alito found the
officers’ conduct was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. “We
must also keep in mind that a threat that may seem insignificant to us in the security
of our chambers may appear more substantial to a reasonable officer whose own life
or safety is at stake.”163
Similarly, in Leveto v. Lapina,164 the plaintiffs challenged on Fourth Amendment
grounds actions by IRS agents who raided their home and veterinary clinic in a search
for evidence of tax violations.165 During the search, agents detained plaintiffs sepa-
rately for six to eight hours incommunicado, interrogated each of them without pro-
viding Miranda warnings, and seized thousands of confidential documents.166 Judge
Alito found severe violations under the Constitution, but held the agents were pro-
tected by qualified immunity.167 With respect to each constitutional violation, Judge
Alito found that they were not clearly established at the time of the searches and
seizures, and therefore the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.168
In United States v. Lee,169 the FBI installed video recording equipment in a hotel
suite that was rented for the defendant by an informant.170 The FBI installed video
cameras in the room without a warrant, and the government argued that this did not
differ from placing a wire on the body of the informant as the defendant had no ex-
pectation of privacy with respect to conversations with the informant.171 On the other
hand, the defendant argued a difference between recording equipment on the infor-
mant and placing surveillance equipment that stays in a private room twenty-four
hours a day irrespective of the informant’s presence.172 Judge Alito held that the use
159 Mellott v. Heemer, 161 F.3d 117, 123 (3d Cir. 1998), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1160 (1999).
160 Id. at 119–20.
161 Id. at 120.
162 Id. at 120–21.
163 Id. at 122.
164 258 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2001).
165 Id. at 156–57.
166 Id. at 160–61.
167 Id. at 166.
168 Id.
169 359 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 955 (2004).
170 Id. at 199.
171 Id. at 202.
172 Id. at 200.
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of a fixed electronic device to record a meeting with an informant does not violate
the Fourth Amendment.173
IV. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE: CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS’S
DECISIONS FROM SEPTEMBER 2005 THROUGH JUNE 2013
[T]he importance of the question does not justify our rushing to
decide it.174
The judicial record of the Chief Justice is best characterized as one of temperance
and moderation. He consistently makes free use of the doctrine of justiciability and
the principles of judicial avoidance in his jurisprudence. He is reticent to deploy the
Supreme Court’s authority unless he believes it absolutely necessary. He is, in his
opinions, loath to create overarching constitutional edicts, preferring instead to decide
cases individually. He is deferential to both congressional and executive authority, as
well as judicial precedent. His opinions habitually take a reserved, reasonable tone
that logically and dispassionately progresses through his argument or dissent.
In keeping with his tendency toward reticence, the Chief Justice has not been
especially prolific during his tenure. He has authored barely one-hundred total Su-
preme Court Opinions, dissents, and concurrences out of more than five hundred cases
that have come before him. This Part first considers his work regarding the issue of
judicial avoidance, which contains many of his defining opinions.175 Second, he has
taken a vocal interest in the limits of government authority, particularly executive and
legislative authority, writing to support judicial deference and restraint in at least five
key cases.176 Also, many of his writings pertain to constitutional civil rights, particu-
larly in the area of the First Amendment, which he typically supports but construes
narrowly.177 Finally, Chief Justice Roberts has made several notable contributions
to the area of criminal procedure.178 Within every area of law, Chief Justice Roberts
can be seen to rely most often on four defining principles of jurisprudence: judicial
avoidance, judicial deference, narrow construction, and clarity.
A. Judicial Avoidance
Chief Justice Roberts strongly believes in judicial restraint. He will not hear a case
that has not perfected justiciability in every aspect, regardless of the nature of the
173 Id. at 203.
174 Nw. Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504,
2508 (2009).
175 See infra Part IV.A.
176 See infra Part IV.B.
177 See infra Part IV.C.
178 See infra Part IV.D.
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issue at hand.179 If he does see fit to hear a case, his opinions are usually clearly
directed only to the circumstances at hand—avoiding generalized rules and broad
interpretations. He does not rush to address constitutional issues; if he can decide a
case on procedural or legislative grounds then he will do so, regardless of the contro-
versy in question. The Chief Justice has established himself as a judge who does not
rush to decide an issue on the merits unless he believes it to be strictly necessary, and
those cases are certain to be irresolvable on all grounds other than judicial review.
For example, in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder (NAMUDNO),180 a 2009 case, the Chief Justice indicated that the Voting
Rights Act may have been outdated,181 but he nonetheless led the majority in declin-
ing to rule on the constitutionality thereof.182 Rather than address the controversial
issue of the Act’s constitutionality, he instead led the Court to choose another route,
opting to construe the statutory definition of “political subdivision” as broader than
that defined in the Act itself.183 By doing so, Chief Justice Roberts avoided ruling on
the constitutionality of the Act, instead determining that the issue of constitutionality
was only an argument in the alternative to the applicability of the Act.184 NAMUDNO
is most notable for containing what might be considered a guiding principle of the
Chief Justice’s opinions, that, “the importance of the question does not justify our
rushing to decide it.”185
In the context of NAMUDNO, Chief Justice Roberts’s discussion of the constitu-
tional issues—including the exceptional and intrusive nature of the Voting Rights
Act—was moderately unusual, as it was not necessary to discuss the Act in such de-
tail in order to reach the decision of the Court.186 Although much of the constitutional
issue is presented in the context of factual background, the Chief Justice also wrote
several paragraphs discussing the constitutional argument and the need for the Court
to address it.187 This discussion foreshadowed his majority opinion in Shelby County
v. Holder in 2013,188 which declared part of the Act unconstitutional.189 It is not clear
what motivated the constitutional discussion in NAMUDNO. It may have been linked
to the dissent by Justice Thomas, the need to address what he saw as a pressing issue,
or arguably a means of warning the legislature of the Court’s stance toward the Act
179 See, e.g., NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535
(2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
180 129 S. Ct. 2504.
181 Id. at 2512, 2516.
182 Id. at 2516.
183 Id. at 2514–15.
184 Id. at 2513.
185 Id. at 2508.
186 See id. at 2511–12.
187 Id. at 2511–13.
188 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
189 Id. at 2631.
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should it be forced to consider such a case on the merits.190 However, it might have
been more truly in keeping with principles of avoidance to mention the issue only
passingly. A similar pattern is seen in National Federation of Independent Businesses
v. Sebelius (NFIB),191 although in that case the tendency toward dicta is amplified.192
If NAMUDNO is any indication, some of the dicta in NFIB may appear again in a
discussion on the merits of later cases.193
The Chief Justice advocated application of the same principle of avoidance seen
in NAMUDNO in his dissent to Boumediene v. Bush.194 The majority determined that
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were entitled to habeas corpus relief; however,
Chief Justice Roberts disagreed on the grounds that none of the detainees had ex-
hausted the remedies offered to them by statute.195 In his determination, it was pre-
mature to determine the scope of habeas corpus relief without first determining that
the statutory remedies granted to detainees were inappropriate to protect their rights.196
He further objected that the statutory system was adequate to protect those rights,
and thus that any determination of relief was only an inappropriate attempt by the
Court to control federal policy.197 This is very much in keeping with a moderate and
temperate theory of jurisprudence. Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissent
in Massachusetts v. EPA opining that there was no controversy or redressability, and
thus no justiciability, when Massachusetts challenged the EPA’s environmental reg-
ulation statutes.198
This refusal to intervene judicially when inappropriate has remained steadfast,
even in the face of serious allegations such as torture. In Munaf v. Geren,199 Chief
Justice Roberts refused to oppose the transfer of American citizens into Iraqi cus-
tody to be prosecuted for their crimes in Iraq, despite objections that they would be
tortured.200 He ruled that determinations about possible torture concerns and the fit-
ness of prison facilities internationally were within the purview of the executive
branch, and declined to overrule executive authority on the issue.201 Again, despite
serious and pressing concerns, the Chief Justice adhered to his firm beliefs on the role
of the judiciary.202
190 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2511–13.
191 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
192 Id. at 2577–80; see also infra Part IV.B.1.c.
193 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622–24; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–94; NAMUDNO,
129 S. Ct. at 2511–13.
194 553 U.S. 723, 801 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 804–05.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 801–02.
198 549 U.S. 497, 535–36 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
199 553 U.S. 674, 700–03 (2008).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 See generally Munaf, 553 U.S. 674.
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Even where the Chief Justice reaches a conclusion on the merits, he usually
chooses to create limited, fact-based holdings as opposed to generalized rules of
constitutionality. In Graham v. Florida,203 the case of a juvenile sentenced to life
without parole, he authored a concurrence to affirm that the sentence was in this case
unconstitutional, but objected to the majority’s ruling that such sentences are always
unconstitutional.204 In his opinion, there was a sufficient framework already in place
to determine constitutionality on a case-by-case basis.205 Chief Justice Roberts also
indicated that there were other cases in which he felt such a sentence was warranted,
and objected to the Court’s use of a single fact-pattern as a vehicle to categorically
overrule prior jurisprudence.206
B. Government Authority: Articles I, II, and III of the U.S. Constitution
Much of Chief Justice Roberts’s tendency toward judicial restraint may be attri-
buted to his support for executive and legislative authority. He stands for a limited
judicial authority that refrains from passing on the constitutionality of government
action unless necessary and a strong deference to the authority of each governmental
branch in its own field. His opinions on congressional authority, executive authority,
and the judiciary make it clear that he is a strong proponent of the constitutional sepa-
ration of powers doctrine.
1. Article I: Congressional Authority
The Chief Justice favors congressional authority and federal preemption if nec-
essary; however, this is balanced by respect for state sovereignty when appropriate
and a willingness to oppose federal legislative overreaching. Although Chief Justice
Roberts has voiced respect for the respective branches of government and the authority
of each branch in its field,207 his opinions are less deferential to the authority of fed-
eral administrative agencies.208 During his tenure, the Court has specifically addressed
groundbreaking cases of state immigration laws, the dormant Commerce Clause, and
federal healthcare reform, amongst other issues.209
203 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2039 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
204 Id. at 2036.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 2041–42.
207 See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689.
208 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2616, 2624 (2013).
209 See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (healthcare reform); Arizona v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (immigration); United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (dormant Commerce Clause).
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a. Immigration
In context of the Chief Justice’s established support for the text of the Constitu-
tion, including federal preemption when necessary, his recent stance on immigration
is not surprising. In Arizona v. United States,210 Chief Justice Roberts joined in a
majority opinion that invalidated most of a proposed Arizona immigration law reg-
ulating unauthorized aliens.211 The majority held that three out of four challenged
aspects of the legislation were preempted as trespassing on a field of pervasive fed-
eral regulation.212 The fourth contested statute was determined to be not yet ripe for
review, as there existed a possibility that the text could be construed and applied in
a fashion consistent with the federal scheme.213 Although the Chief Justice did not
author any part of this opinion, these conclusions are clearly in keeping with his
judicial philosophy. They exhibit strong deference to federal authority in those fields
granted by the Constitution, as well as reluctance to rule on issues that might be
resolved without judicial interference.
Although his work shows a strong respect for congressional authority, Chief
Justice Roberts will not refrain from invalidating federal law or the policies of federal
agencies if he sees a need. In a different immigration case, Judulang v. Holder,214 the
Chief Justice joined the majority in declaring the policy of the Board of Immigration
Appeals for deportation relief “arbitrary and capricious” although he did not author
any part of this opinion either.215
b. The Commerce Clause
Chief Justice Roberts has been known to be deferential to not only federal
government, but to state and local government when appropriate. In United Haulers
Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,216 he authored
the majority opinion—in favor of local government—regarding a private business’s
challenge to local waste hauling ordinances that favored the government.217 He deter-
mined in that case that the dormant Commerce Clause did not prohibit local govern-
ments from favoring themselves in waste-control ordinances.218 Further, he again
lauded the benefits of moderation and judicial restraint in his conclusion, where he
noted that it is outside the purview of the Court to impose judicial supremacy on the
210 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
211 See id. at 2492.
212 Id. at 2510.
213 Id.
214 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
215 Id. at 479.
216 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
217 See id. at 330.
218 Id. at 347.
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police functions of local governments and cautioned against using the Commerce
Clause as a vehicle to reclaim Lochner-era judicial oversight.219
c. Healthcare Reform
It is not unusual, given the Chief Justice’s typically restraint-oriented view of the
Commerce Clause, that he would lead the majority in invalidating a congressional
attempt to use the clause as a vehicle for federal healthcare reform.220 His deference
to other branches does have an outer limit, and this is particularly clear in relation to
the Commerce Clause where his opinions indicate he is wary of abuse.221 The ruling
in NFIB222 is notable in this regard for numerous reasons.223 For example, it is un-
usual for the Chief Justice to construe a statute in a manner that obliges a ruling rather
than avoids it.224 Other points of note include the rhetoric of Chief Justice Roberts’s
Commerce Clause decision and his construction of the Medicaid expansion.225 While
a number of these elements are surprising and even immoderate when taken alone, in
context of the decision and its repercussions, the Chief Justice’s opinion can be argu-
ably construed as the epitome of moderation and judicial restraint.
The first extraordinary component of the decision in NFIB is the Chief Justice’s
dismissal of the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act, an act prohibiting judicial
review of taxes not yet legally due.226 While the majority opinion favoring judicial
review is not controversial, it is unusual in that it construes legislation as a non-tax for
the purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, but later labels the same as a tax in the hold-
ing.227 It is virtually unprecedented for the Chief Justice to go to such efforts to con-
strue a matter as justiciable, rather than the inverse.228 As the dissent points out, this
determination takes some amount of seemingly contradictory textual interpretation.229
Regardless, the Chief Justice seemed to feel that judicial intervention was warranted
by Congress’s use of Commerce Clause authority, which is possibly the most surpris-
ing element of the decision.230
219 Id. (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
220 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012).
221 See, e.g., United Haulers, 550 U.S. 330.
222 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
223 See Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald B. Stuart, What Implications Will the Supreme
Court’s Taxing Power Decision Have on the Goals of the Affordable Care Act and
Healthcare?, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 2, 189, 204–11 (2013).
224 See id. at 207–09.
225 See id.; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585–93, 2601–08.
226 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582–83.
227 Id. at 2594.
228 See NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2516–17 (2009) (considering a matter as
non-justicable).
229 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2656 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting) (“That
carries verbal wizardry too far, deep into the forbidden land of the sophists.”).
230 Id. at 2600–01 (majority opinion).
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In his consideration of the healthcare individual mandate,231 Chief Justice Roberts
wrote a separate, lone opinion opposing the notion that Congress could force indi-
viduals to participate in the economy under the Commerce Clause.232 Such digres-
sion is highly unusual for the Chief Justice, given that the case was readily decided
on other grounds.233 In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts drew a distinction between
regulating commerce and creating commerce, and denied that Congress has the au-
thority to regulate individuals for failing to participate in commerce.234 He further
provided a notable amount of detail as to the possible implications of allowing such
a use, which is also uncharacteristic, even going so far as to provide an illustration
utilizing Wickard v. Filburn.235 This sort of unnecessary dicta regarding a constitu-
tional matter in a case that was resolved on other grounds is almost antithetical to the
judicial philosophy of avoidance evinced in Chief Justice Roberts’s work to date. In
explanation, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that he felt the need to consider and dis-
miss the most natural interpretation of the statute before an alternate construction;
however, this seems inadequate in the context of his jurisprudence.236
Why the dicta, then? It is hard to know so early in the Chief Justice’s tenure, but
perhaps he was motivated to some degree to adopt a more balanced, cautious approach
in high profile cases in order to protect the reputation of the Court as an institution. It
is also possible that the Chief Justice feels very strongly about the Commerce Clause,
and there is some evidence that he strongly disapproves of broad interpretation of these
powers.237 He has addressed unnecessary constitutional issues as dicta in at least three
prior instances;238 and if cases such as NAMUDNO239 are representative of his motives,
he may be issuing a tacit warning to Congress regarding the Court’s views about the
constitutionality of Commerce Clause issues. It may also be the case that he felt that
Congress’s use of its Commerce powers could not go unremarked in the instance of
healthcare reform; perhaps he felt it was necessary to accept the urgent invitation of
both sides to answer this question.240 Or it is possible that he felt the need to balance
231 There were three primary issues before the Court: (1) the Court’s authority to hear the
case under the Anti-Injunction Act; (2) the constitutionality of the Healthcare Individual
Mandate requiring citizens to purchase healthcare; and (3) the constitutionality of the Medicaid
expansion requiring states to comply with the Act or lose federal Medicaid funding. Id. at
2581–82.
232 Id. at 2593.
233 See id. at 2608.
234 Id. at 2587–93.
235 Id. at 2587–88 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
236 Id. at 2593–94.
237 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330 (2007) (explaining the Chief Justice’s views on the Commerce Clause).
238 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011); NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129
S. Ct. 2504, 2511–13 (2009); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 700–03 (2008).
239 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504.
240 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586.
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the decision favoring liberal policy, the result of which was displeasing to many con-
servative factions, with a discussion of the Commerce Clause which was undoubtedly
beneficial to those same conservative factions.241 Neither possibility, however, fits
neatly with the moderate, objectively removed judicial persona that the Chief Justice
has presented to date, and the involved Commerce discussion in NFIB remains an
outlier in his jurisprudence in both tone and substance.242
Despite these oddities, holistically the NFIB decision achieved a very moderate
resolution of the healthcare issue.243 Whether intended or not, Chief Justice Roberts
found a balance between the liberal and conservative factions who sought to either
approve or dismiss the Act in its entirety.244 The decision, via an affirmation of con-
gressional taxation authority and a single modification to the Act itself, transformed
healthcare reform from a controversial mandate to an optional program that, if it is
successful, grants states the discretionary power to provide more citizens with health-
care.245 The decision had merits for both conservative and liberal factions, and was
overall an extremely temperate path, even though it was at odds with what might have
been expected of the Court and of Chief Justice Roberts as an individual.
However, the holding in NFIB, while arguably achieving a balanced political
outcome, is far from perfect.246 First, the excision of the required Medicaid expansion
fundamentally altered the Act and thwarted its intentions of insuring more Americans
by removing one of the Act’s most powerful enforcement tools.247 Without the large-
scale implementation originally considered by the Act, its benefits and effects are now
less available and far more tenuous.248 With the Court’s designation of the Act as a tax
rather than a mandate, even its likely impact on an individual’s decision to obtain
insurance is now unclear. The Court’s decision, without a doubt, took away a sub-
stantial portion of the Act’s authority and thus its potential mandated success in im-
plementation.249 To interpret the Act in a way that arguably frustrates the intent of a
majority of Congress and the President is considered by some to be a vulgar applica-
tion of judicial power.250 However, while this decision may contravene the executive
and legislative intent behind the Act, Chief Justice Roberts’s first priority is always
what he sees as the boundaries of the Constitution regardless of the influence of
external powers.
241 See generally id.
242 Compare, e.g., id., with Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
243 See generally NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
244 See generally id.
245 See id. at 2601 (discussing outcomes if the mandate is upheld).
246 See generally id.
247 See, e.g., Gonzales & Stuart, supra note 223, at 224–25.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See id. at 209 (discussing the dissent).
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Finally, the NFIB opinion is notable for its legal novelty. On its face, Chief Justice
Roberts’s analysis of congressional taxing authority appears to permit large-scale taxa-
tion as a blatant incentivizing alternative to express regulation. While Chief Justice
Roberts made clear arguments on the basis of precedent which showed how all of
these actions were already within congressional power, their usage in a context such
as national healthcare is nonetheless novel and controversial.251 It is possible to argue
that it is an unwarranted and unprecedented expansion of congressional authority with-
out outer limits, but the majority opinion seems to set clear limits on such taxation that
diminish the likelihood of an unchecked legislative taxing power.252 Chief Justice
Roberts was clear to explain in detail, for instance, how in NFIB the incentivizing
effect was neither unprecedented nor oppressive because it represented a legitimate
choice.253 He additionally made certain to explain why the individual mandate quali-
fied as a tax rather than as a penalty, and indicated that any deviation from this stan-
dard would result in potential legislation being classified as a non-tax.254
Whatever the merits of the policy resulting from the Chief Justice’s opinion, or
even the legitimacy of the legal justification, the decision here eventually favored the
people: It effectively placed most of the responsibility for choosing healthcare on the
citizens, as they were given the option in 2012 to elect the President that would spear-
head the Act’s implementation, as well as the state representatives who would choose
either to enroll or not to enroll in the state Medicaid expansion. The Chief Justice
might have achieved the same result through determining that the case was not yet
ripe for review, which, with the approval of those on the Court who approve of the
Act, would have allowed the voters to determine the outcome in November elections.
Arguably the decision not to decide would have been a more typical decision by Chief
Justice Roberts,255 with fewer peculiar elements. While his motives for choosing the
route he did are inscrutable, it seems apparent that the Court’s controversial decision
favors, as is constitutionally appropriate, government by the people.
2. Article II: Executive Authority
Chief Justice Roberts supports executive authority, and is highly deferential to
executive discretion within its designated sphere—most especially in regard to war
251 See id. at 210 (discussing the dissenters’ opinion of the Act).
252 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596–600 (2012).
253 Id. at 2596–97.
254 Id. at 2596–600.
255 Arizona v. United States is somewhat telling in this respect: If there is legislation that
might be construed constitutionally, the Chief Justice does not oppose using a “wait and see”
approach upon review. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (expressing this position in the majority opinion
joined by the Chief Justice). However, if the legislation is seemingly incapable of being con-
strued constitutionally, then the Chief Justice will oppose enactment before it has an oppor-
tunity to be construed by the government, regardless of ripeness. See generally id.
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and national security. However, in areas of judicial responsibility, he will not readily
defer to presidential suggestion, even if the issue at hand is one related to foreign
affairs. His philosophy in this respect is one of limitation—each branch has absolute
authority, but only within its constitutionally limited realm.256
For example, the Chief Justice has upheld the president’s ability to dismiss prin-
cipal officers of federal agencies as necessary to his ability to faithfully execute U.S.
laws, and has held unconstitutional congressional attempts to insulate certain offi-
cers from presidential removal for cause.257 He authored the majority opinion in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board indicating that such
an insulating arrangement violated separation of powers principles, and defied the
electoral system by removing the people’s choice of executive from the processes for
which he was chosen.258 He justified his position by referencing the possible reper-
cussions if such a system were multiplied, insulating certain officers through a multi-
tude of protections.259 The Chief Justice often uses a similar method of illustrating his
point by applying a potential holding to an array of future cases as the standard.260
The Chief Justice has similarly upheld the authority of the executive in matters of war
and national security,261 but has declined to extend the executive’s role in matters of
foreign policy to include ratifying treaties domestically.262
a. War and National Security
A notable case for the Chief Justice was Boumediene v. Bush, where the majority
decided that military detainees held at Guantanamo Bay were to be accorded proce-
dural due process, and that the tribunal system set in place by the executive branch
was inadequate to afford that process.263 Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissatisfied
dissent strongly criticizing the majority opinion for the creation of a broad and un-
enforceable rule of policy, as well as for making such a decision on the grounds of
what he perceived to be political motivations.264 He stated, “One cannot help but think,
after surveying the modest practical results of the majority’s ambitious opinion, that
this decision is not really about the detainees at all, but about control of federal policy
regarding enemy combatants.”265
256 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147
(2010) (discussing the separation of powers).
257 Id. at 3147.
258 Id. at 3155.
259 Id.
260 See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012).
261 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
262 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
263 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798 (explaining the place of the Constitution during
“extraordinary times”).
264 Id. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
265 Id.
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Despite these substantial misgivings, the important point in Boumediene for the
Chief Justice was that, in his opinion, the case ought to have been decided on other
grounds.266 He wrote his dissent primarily to explain why the system already in place,
constructed by the elected political branches, was adequate to preserve all rights due
to detainees.267 As he considered this adequacy to be a threshold inquiry, which in this
case was met, Chief Justice Roberts felt the case ought to have been dismissed without
further consideration.268 He also joined in Justice Scalia’s dissent,269 but it is repre-
sentative of Chief Justice Roberts’s priorities that he chose the key issue as one of
avoidance. The Chief Justice’s dissent clearly evidences his strong support for the
system set in place by the executive for wartime detainees under executive control,
and may be reasonably regarded as similarly supportive of the executive’s wartime
authority and discretion.270
b. Foreign Policy
Although the Chief Justice supports the executive when constitutionally appro-
priate, he nonetheless draws a very rigid distinction between matters of foreign policy
and matters of the judiciary. Particularly, in 2007, he led the majority in Medellin
v. Texas271 to conclude that a decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a
dispute-resolving body of the United Nations, was not applicable as domestic law.272
Specifically, the ICJ determined that the United States had violated an Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention by failing to afford certain criminal aliens various
required consular notification benefits.273 The ICJ ruled that the United States was
obliged to review the verdicts of fifty-one named Mexican nationals in light of the
Protocol’s consular notification process.274 Out of deference to the ICJ decision,
President George W. Bush issued an executive memorandum dictating that the United
States would fulfill these international obligations and that state courts should give
effect to the ICJ’s judgment.275
When Medellin appealed his state-court death sentence to the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority, determining that the ICJ decision simply
was not applicable domestically because the treaty itself was not self-executing.276
266 Id. at 802.
267 Id. at 802–03.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 826 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
270 See id. at 801–27 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (supporting executive power over detainees).
271 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
272 Id.
273 Id. at 499–501.
274 Id. at 497–98.
275 Id. at 498.
276 That is, the treaty did not by its terms or existence bring into effect binding domestic
law. Id. at 521–23.
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Instead, the Chief Justice found that the treaty textually called for ratification by leg-
islation in order to be effected domestically, and that no such legislation existed.277
As such, the ICJ opinion was notable, but did not overrule the authority of state
courts once they had reached a fair and impartial decision.278 Because there was no
domestic law here to the contrary, the issue was considered a purely judicial ques-
tion that the courts had already lawfully resolved.279
This was a politically charged decision, as the Court effectively approved
Medellin’s capital punishment, which was administered, despite the ICJ order by the
United Nations.280 This decision only serves to show how strong the divide is between
the political branches for Chief Justice Roberts, as even a decision by the United
Nations coupled with an executive order by the President who nominated him to the
Court could not sway him to deviate from constitutional principles of domestic sov-
ereignty and separation of powers. His commitment to the principle embodied in the
Youngstown tripartite,281 that the president does not have the authority to, by execu-
tive memorandum, dictate domestic law into existence, was embodied in the Medellin
decision.282 He recognized the import of his decision in the opinion, where he opined
that commitments to international law and relations with foreign governments are
“plainly compelling” interests, but that, “[s]uch considerations . . . do not allow us to
set aside first principles.”283
3. Article III: The Judiciary
The Chief Justice strongly favors a reserved judiciary; he does not deem it nec-
essary to exert the Court’s authority in every occasion of possible misconduct, but
instead advocates first cautiously determining if that authority is warranted and the
case is justiciable. The Chief Justice’s strong respect for the authority of the separate
powers and the principles of judicial avoidance do not, however, limit his understand-
ing of the scope of judicial authority.284 In Munaf v. Geren,285 for instance, he declared
in no uncertain terms that the United States has the authority and the obligation to hear
habeas corpus petitions by all U.S. citizens held in custody by color of U.S. law.286
277 Id. at 508–10, 521.
278 Id. at 522–23.
279 See id. (explaining the limits of foreign holdings domestically).
280 See id. at 532 (upholding the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals).
281 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (examining the separation of powers).
282 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 528, 532.
283 Id. at 524.
284 See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text (regarding American citizens scheduled
to be surrendered to the Iraqi government who, fearing torture, sought habeas corpus relief).
285 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
286 Id. at 705.
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Both this case and Medellin show that he will not shirk the justiciable obligations of
the Court, regardless of extenuating circumstances.287
C. Civil Rights: The First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution
Civil rights is an area of law where the Chief Justice has a very clear voice. His
opinions demonstrate that he feels strongly on a personal level about many civil rights–
related actions which he has found to be unconstitutional.288 He is an especially large
proponent of equality and equal treatment across racial and cultural boundaries.289 He
is also an advocate for the general applicability of constitutional rights without excep-
tion, regardless of the factual palatability of the situation.290 He has written numerous
notable opinions in these areas, most especially regarding the First, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments regarding free speech and religion, equal protection, and
fundamental rights such as abortion, privacy, and marriage.
1. The First Amendment
Several cases seem to make a clear statement that the Chief Justice is an advocate
of separation of church and state, as well as an advocate for the rights of religious
groups and the right to free speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment. His opin-
ions on free speech are especially notable for their passion, and seem to indicate his
strong feelings about these issues.291 This does not mean, however, that Chief Justice
Roberts is uncharacteristically eager to hear such cases.292 Although he supports the
First Amendment readily, his primary considerations still focus on the tenets of jus-
ticiability and judicial restraint in cases of both freedom of speech and freedom of
religion and assembly.293
287 Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts then proceeded to indicate that there was a complete
lack of such relief available in this case, as it would intrude on the sovereignty of foreign
powers without proper authority. Id. at 700. This is particularly interesting considering his
later opinion in Medellin, where he seems to expect that foreign powers should similarly
refrain from such intrusion into U.S. domestic law. Compare id. at 700–03, with Medellin,
552 U.S. 491.
288 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–18 (2011).
289 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
290 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
291 See, e.g., Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215–20.
292 At least three cases that explicitly addressed religious concerns have been avoided during
his tenure on grounds such as standing and sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Sossamon v. Texas,
131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011);
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
293 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710
(2012); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05 (2007) (explicitly restricting the holdings
to the facts of the case).
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a. Freedom of Speech
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears
of both joy and sorrow, and . . . inflict great pain. . . . [W]e cannot
react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have
chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure
that we do not stifle public debate.294
Chief Justice Roberts has advocated for freedom of speech in numerous contexts,
such as that of controversial private speech of public significance.295 In 2011, the Chief
Justice authored the majority opinion in Snyder v. Phelps, declaring lawful the inflam-
matory conduct of religious picketers near a military funeral of a soldier killed in the
Iraq War.296 The picketers were not on cemetery grounds, did not disrupt the funeral,
and their signs could not be seen from the graveside service.297 This point was signifi-
cant for the majority; the picketers conducted a peaceful and legal demonstration in
a location they were entitled to access.298 However, Chief Justice Roberts first con-
fronted the petitioner’s299 argument that the content of the speech itself was not consti-
tutionally protected due to its personal nature.300 Primarily relying on direct quotes from
precedent, he first determined that the speech was protected as a matter of public sig-
nificance (the war and homosexuality in the military).301 In doing so, the Chief Justice
made a stand for strong First Amendment protections despite political controversy.
Nonetheless, in keeping with his principles of jurisprudence, Chief Justice Roberts was
very clear in his conclusion that this holding was limited to only the facts at hand.302
Chief Justice Roberts has also advocated for free speech in the context of federal
voting and campaigning regulations.303 In a somewhat controversial five-to-four,
multi-concurrence decision, the Chief Justice authored the majority opinion uphold-
ing a non-profit corporation’s right to air a politically oriented radio advertisement
before an election.304 The challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, an act
ratified as facially valid four years prior, overcame contentions of mootness and was
determined to be in violation of the First Amendment as applied.305 Chief Justice
294 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 1218–20.
298 Id.
299 The petitioner in Snyder was the father of the deceased soldier. Id. at 1213–14.
300 Id. at 1217.
301 Id. at 1215, 1218.
302 Id. at 1220.
303 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
304 Id. at 455–57.
305 Id. at 461–64, 476–81.
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Roberts concluded his opinion by advocating the necessity, when in doubt, of ruling
in favor of speech rather than censorship.306
Chief Justice Roberts has also invalidated other types of federal legislation due to
First Amendment concerns.307 In 2010, he invalidated a federal ban on depictions of
animal cruelty for reasons similar to those he eventually voiced in Snyder.308 This case
is helpful in determining his First Amendment philosophy:
As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, [a societal
cost-benefit balancing test] is startling and dangerous. The First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative
social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a
judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restric-
tions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution
forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis
that some speech is not worth it.309
This does speak to a constructionist tendency by the Chief Justice to protect most
forms of speech from censure, regardless of the social condemnation that speech
might elicit. There are, of course, exceptions—specifically in those cases related to the
protection of children—like the school-specific case holding in Morse v. Frederick,310
or the 2008 case ratifying an anti–child pornography law.311
For example, several years earlier, based on a very different set of facts, the Chief
Justice struck down a free speech claim, holding that a principal may confiscate a stu-
dent banner promoting illegal drug use at a school event.312 In the majority opinion
for Morse, Justice Roberts granted school officials special authority to restrict drug-
related student expression at school that could not otherwise be constitutionally re-
stricted.313 Because the threat of promoting illicit drug use presented what the Court
considered to be a real danger, the confiscation was deemed acceptable.314 Although
306 Id. at 482. These principles are well summarized with surprising specificity in Justice
Alito’s concurrence to Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, a case striking down
a California law banning the sale of violent video games to minors (the Chief Justice did not
author an opinion in that case, but did join in Justice Alito’s concurrence). Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring); see infra notes 558–64
and accompanying text.
307 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582, 1592 (2010).
308 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011); see supra notes 296–302 and accom-
panying text (concerning the religious picketers at a military funeral).
309 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
310 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
311 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008).
312 Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
313 Id. at 408–09.
314 Id.
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there was some debate as to how to interpret the limited, unclear precedent in this
area, the Chief Justice (unsurprisingly) extracted only the minimal principles neces-
sary to decide the case and refused to otherwise resolve a concrete First Amendment
analysis.315 This case is most telling of his jurisprudential philosophy, which will lead
him, if warranted by the facts, to limit a freedom he most often supports.
b. Freedom of Religion and Assembly
Chief Justice Roberts has also had more than one occasion to uphold the First
Amendment on grounds of freedom of religion and assembly.316 In 2012, the Chief
Justice wrote the majority opinion in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church & School
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, barring an employment discrimina-
tion suit brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against a church
by a congregationally appointed “called” teacher.317 He held that the “ministerial ex-
ception,” grounded in the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of religion, pro-
tected a church’s ability to choose who would govern and lead it.318 To interfere, even
for possible ADA violations, would strip the church of its religious autonomy.319 As
such, the Chief Justice determined that this was a rare occasion that called upon the
Court to protect religious institutions in accordance with the intent of the First Amend-
ment, granting the church the freedom to “choose those who will guide it on its way.”320
Typically, however, he limited the holding to the facts of the case and the context of
employment discrimination.321 He concluded that “[t]here will be time enough to ad-
dress the applicability of the exception to other circumstances [such as contract and
torts actions] if and when they arise.”322
Chief Justice Roberts authored another majority opinion early in his tenure that up-
held the same autonomy of religion, but in the surprising context of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (CSA).323 The issue at hand in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
315 Id. at 404–05.
316 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710
(2012); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 433 (2006).
317 Hosanna, 132 S. Ct. at 694. The plaintiff was a “called teacher” who had undergone
extensive religious education, been certified by the church, and “called” by the congregation
before serving as a grade school teacher, as opposed to other “lay teachers” at her school who
had no such religious education or certification. Id. at 699–700. Although there was some
dispute as to whether she met the standard of a minister, Justice Roberts found her status as
a “commissioned minister” and her corresponding treatment and duties to be persuasive. Id.
at 707–08.





323 Although the primary law in this case was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA), the Chief Justice made a number of references to the Free Exercise Clause in
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Uniao do Vegetal was whether the Government’s request for a preliminary injunction
against a Brazilian church’s use of hoasca, a hallucinogenic drug from the Amazon re-
gion used in sacramental tea, was warranted.324 He concluded that the Government had
failed to meet the compelling interest test required to intrude on RFRA-protected325
religious beliefs and practices.326
It is of note that O Centro was in the preliminary injunction stage, and that this
was not a final decision on the merits.327 However, the protective policy set forth, and
the determination that the Government had evidenced no compelling interest, both
bolstered protection of genuine religious use of hallucinogenic drugs.328 The Chief
Justice showed little regard for the CSA in this context, referencing the peyote exemp-
tion for Native American tribes, and opined that “congressional findings with respect
to [CSA] substances should not carry the determinative weight, for RFRA purposes,
that the Government would ascribe to them.”329
In light of this history, it is not surprising to find that Chief Justice Roberts sided
with the dissent, although he did not author an opinion, in a 2010 decision holding that
a law school’s policy requiring a Christian student organization to admit all members
was reasonable.330 Justice Alito’s dissent in Christian Society Chapter of the University
of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez addressed precedent upholding
student organizations’ rights to free speech, as well as invoking doctrines of expressive
association and free exercise of religion, to contend that religious student organizations
are entitled to require their members to hold viewpoints in keeping with the values
of the organization.331 This merely reiterates the Chief Justice’s viewpoint that reli-
gious institutions and organizations should not be held to certain regulations that im-
pair their ability to conduct their theological affairs as their religion dictates.
2. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Equal Protection
The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrim-
inating on the basis of race.332
It is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race.333
his foundational comments. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao de Vegetal, 546
U.S. 449, 431–33 (2006).
324 Id. at 423.
325 See supra note 323 for a brief discussion related to the RFRA.
326 O Centro, 546 U.S. at 439.
327 Id. at 423.
328 See id. at 433.
329 Id.
330 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978, 2995, 3000 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
331 Id. at 3000–20.
332 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
333 League United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
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Chief Justice Roberts is also a strong advocate for the Constitution in the context
of equal protection. For instance, he authored the majority opinion in Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (PICS), a key 2006 case bar-
ring, under Fifth Amendment principles, the use of racial classifications as a tool to
promote racial diversity in school districting and student assignment plans.334 Even
in the context of promoting racial diversity or remedying past racial harms, the Chief
Justice held in PICS that racial segregation of students into categories of black and
non-black for purposes of determining which public school they should attend was
impermissible.335 PICS is also interesting because the Chief Justice distinguished
Grutter v. Bollinger336 as acceptable, defending in some detail the holistic approach
to racial diversity in higher education that considers race as one of many factors to be
considered in admitting students.337 Typical of his methodically fact-based approach
and despite his strong feelings against racial classifications, PICS initially implied that
there may be some circumstances, including affirmative action, where Justice Roberts
sees race as an acceptable factor for consideration.338
However, more recently, the Court took a stronger stance against multifactor affir-
mative action programs than PICS originally indicated.339 The Chief Justice joined in
the majority opinion in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,340 holding that the ad-
missions policy at the University of Texas, which considers race as one of several fac-
tors in the admissions process, must be held to strict scrutiny on judicial review.341 The
Court reversed and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit for strict-scrutiny review,
but made no decision on the merits of such affirmative action policies.342 The Chief
Justice did not author an opinion, but it is notable that the Court in Fisher effectively
raised the bar on affirmative action–type programs to an almost unreachable standard.343
The Court held that: “In order for judicial review to be meaningful, a university must
make a showing that its plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the only interest that this
Court has approved in this context: the benefits of a student body diversity.”344
Chief Justice Roberts deplores racial distinctions, which can readily be seen in
Fisher345 and a number of similar equal protection holdings in which he has joined.346
334 PICS, 551 U.S. at 708–11.
335 Id. at 747–48.
336 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding as constitutional a college’s admissions policy that con-
sidered race as one of numerous factors in a multifactor review).
337 PICS, 551 U.S. at 722–23.
338 Id.
339 See generally PICS, 551 U.S. 701.
340 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
341 Id. at 2414–15.
342 Id. at 2421–22.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 2421.
345 See id. at 2418.
346 See supra notes 332–33 and accompanying text.
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He concluded PICS with a passionate paragraph discussing the evils of racial classi-
fications by government, quoting extensively from precedent banning racial classifi-
cation in other contexts.347 He spoke of the policy and motivations behind Brown v.
Board of Education,348 as well as the harm of differential treatment based on race that
case sought to rectify.349 But it is his final, decisive statement that is most telling of his
philosophy in this area: “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”350
In this context of championing equal rights, initially it may seem unusual that Chief
Justice Roberts wrote a harsh dissent in part and concurrence in part in an election-
district gerrymandering case with racial overtones.351 The holding in League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry found in favor of Hispanic-American plaintiffs and
against the State of Texas on the basis of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).352 In Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion, the case did not revolve around issues of discrimination, and
as such the Court ought to have shown more deference to the considerations of the
lower courts.353 In his final statements, he opined that the redistricting proposed by the
majority was itself an undesirable form of racial discrimination that was unnecessary
in the circumstances:
Whatever the majority believes it is fighting with its holding, it is
not vote dilution on the basis of race or ethnicity. I do not believe
it is our role to make judgments about which mixes of minority
voters should count for purposes of forming a majority in an elec-
toral district . . . . It is a sordid business, this divvying us up by
race. When . . . the minority enjoys effective political power in the
area well in excess of its proportion of the population, I would
conclude that the courts have no further role to play in rejiggering
the district lines . . . .354
So despite initial appearances, this dissent in fact affirms the Chief Justice’s beliefs
in equality.355 The dissenting form is surprising, and unexpected methods are not
347 PICS, 551 U.S. at 745–48.
348 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding segregation in public schools to be unconstitutional).
349 PICS, 551 U.S. at 746–48.
350 Id. at 748.
351 League United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 493 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
352 Id. at 410. The Chief Justice sharply criticized the majority for what he thought was a
misrepresentation and misinterpretation of the lower court’s fact-finding, namely, that the vot-
ing districts as established actually granted the large majority of the vote to Hispanic-American
citizens. Id. at 493.
353 Id. at 493–94.
354 Id. at 511.
355 The Court, with Chief Justice Roberts in the majority, ruled again on the VRA in 2009.
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). The majority held that crossover districts, where
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unusual for Chief Justice Roberts,356 but the eventual conclusion is foreseeable. Chief
Justice Roberts does not believe in discrimination,357 in any context, even to the benefit
of minorities—an area where many would tread lightly.358
Chief Justice Roberts’s most recent decision on the VRA balances his strong feel-
ings toward racial discrimination with his respect for state sovereignty and congres-
sional authority.359 Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice held Section Four of the
VRA to be unconstitutional.360 Because Section Four mandated a harsh federal pre-
clearance requirement for alterations to certain state voting laws, the Court held that
the standard must be justified by exceptionally disparate racial conditions.361 However,
as the Court had implied in its earlier holding in NAMUDNO,362 the standard on which
Section Four was based has become outdated in the intervening forty-eight years since
its inception.363 The Court found Section Four to be antiquated, based on outmoded data
and practices, and also found that it applied disparately to those few states singled out
for preclearance.364 In closing, the Chief Justice clarified that the rest of the VRA was
not in question, again demonstrating his respect for the legislative process,365 but that
a minority group’s preferred candidate is elected by coalition between the minority and mem-
bers of the racial majority who choose to help support him, but the minority is not large
enough to elect him alone, were not required or forbidden by the VRA. Id. at 1248–49. The
Court declined to require by law the cooperation that has otherwise been achieved in modern
society voluntarily, that is, the ability to elect minority-preferred candidates through the vote
of both minority and majority members. Id. at 1249.
356 See, e.g., NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1204, 1211–13 (2009) (unnecessarily ad-
dressing the constitutionality of an issue not before the Court several years before overturning
part of the VRA on the basis of the same unconstitutionality).
357 The Roberts Court, with the Chief Justice in the majority, similarly affirmed generalized
racial equality when it ruled that a city’s discard of fire-fighting exam results because of a pos-
sible disparate minority impact violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009).
358 Perry, 548 U.S. at 510–11 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
359 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
360 Id. at 2631.
361 Id. at 2627–28.
362 NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1204, 2511–12 (2009).
363 The Chief Justice addressed the earlier holding multiple times, stating that
in 2009, we took care to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the
Voting Rights Act when asked to do so, and instead resolved the case
then before us on statutory grounds. But in issuing that decision, we
expressed our broader concerns about the constitutionality of the Act.
Congress could have updated the coverage formula at that time, but did
not do so.
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
364 Id. at 2627–28.
365 See id. at 2631 (“Striking down an Act of Congress ‘is the gravest and most delicate duty
that this Court is called on to perform.’” (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)
(Holmes, J., concurring))).
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racial discrimination in voting is absolutely unacceptable.366 However, Chief Justice
Roberts and the Court could not condone the outdated Section Four formula for de-
termining which states were subject to the preclearance requirement.367
3. The Fifth and Ninth Amendments: Fundamental Rights
Chief Justice Roberts’s stance on fundamental, non-enumerated rights is less clear.
In many cases, his opinions are tempered with respect for extant legislation.368 During
the Chief Justice’s tenure, the Court has limited the right to abortion, and advocated
balancing this right against the state’s interest in the unborn.369 The Chief Justice has
joined in dissent to a holding illegitimizing use of the Controlled Substances Act to
regulate physician-assisted suicide,370 and has authored or joined in several opinions
limiting a right to privacy.371 Finally, he has recently authored two key opinions re-
garding homosexual marriage.372
a. Abortion
Chief Justice Roberts began leading the Court through historical and precedential
decisions soon after he was confirmed. Early in the Chief Justice’s career, the Court
released Gonzales v. Carhart,373 an important and highly controversial decision in
abortion rights. In Carhart, the Court held the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
to be constitutional,374 thereby limiting the broad rights originally granted to women
seeking abortion by Roe v. Wade.375 Chief Justice Roberts joined in the majority,
holding that Congress had a legitimate interest in promoting a respect for all human
life, and may use methods up to and including limiting the manner in which abortions
may be performed, so long as they do not place an undue burden on a woman seeking
an abortion or a doctor granting one.376
Another case in abortion rights came early in Chief Justice Roberts’s career on
the Court. In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,377 the Court
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006); see
also infra notes 376–83 and accompanying text.
369 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
370 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
371 See, e.g., FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011); Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin.
v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 759 (2011).
372 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting);
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
373 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
374 Id. at 167–68.
375 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
376 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158–64.
377 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
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found that a parental notification act for minors seeking abortions need not be struck
down in its entirety for unconstitutionality.378 The Chief Justice joined with a unani-
mous Supreme Court to determine that while the act was unconstitutional in part, the
remedy need not be a total bar against enforcing the act in its entirety.379 Instead, the
Court ordered the lower courts to reconsider the act and return a more “modest”
remedy.380 The Roberts Court has similarly repeatedly invalidated legislation piece-
meal in other situations in an effort to uphold a law’s legislative intent.381
These cases indicate that whatever the Chief Justice may think of abortion, it is
tempered with a strong respect for the legislature’s legitimate actions. Deference to
each branch of government in its aspect is often evident in his judicial philosophy,
so he predictably supports legislative control whenever possible. It is of note that in
these controversial cases, he chose only to support the constitutional legislation, which
might lead to the incorrect inference that his reactions to other types of controversy
would be similarly deferential.382 In other large cases, such as NFIB, the nature of the
issue at hand—controversial or not—is shown to be only incidental in his determina-
tion of the Court’s appropriate response; Chief Justice Roberts reacts with deference
or assertion to the issues of law, not to the breadth of the controversy.383
b. Privacy
Privacy as a fundamental right rather than a criminal procedure issue has yet to
be a key issue before the Roberts Court. However, Chief Justice Roberts did author a
somewhat skeptical and wry, if not disparaging, opinion for the unanimous majority
in a case regarding the privacy rights of corporations.384 Specifically, in FCC v. AT&T,
378 That is, a lower court had determined the act to be unconstitutional because it did not
provide for a minor’s abortion without parental notification unless death was imminent, a
provision which was potentially harmful to minors. Id. at 325.
379 Id. at 331.
380 Id.
381 See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (invalidating portions of the
Affordable Care Act while leaving the remainder intact).
382 In the same vein of controversial decisions, the Chief Justice joined in the dissent to
a case holding that the Attorney General may not prevent doctors from assisting suicide or
euthanizing patients through means of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). The dissent by Justice Scalia argued that the phrase “legitimate
medical purpose” in the applicable part of the CSA was both valid and entitled to judicial
deference, and as such that the prohibition placed on physicians against euthanasia was a
reasonable interpretation of the Act. Id. at 275. Additionally, the dissent argued that an inde-
pendent analysis of the statute would lead to the same result as the most natural and reason-
able interpretation. Id. at 275–76. Because of these reasons, these justices felt that denying
physicians the right to euthanize patients was perfectly proper under statutory authority. Id.
at 276.
383 See generally NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
384 FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011).
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he held that corporations could not claim a personal privacy exemption under the
Freedom of Information Act to prevent certain records from a federal investigation
from being disclosed to competitors.385 He determined, via exposition of the dictio-
nary, common usage, principles of grammar, context, and legislative intent, that the
term “personal privacy” as used in the Act referred only to people.386 Although the
Chief Justice admitted that a corporation is an artificial person, the Chief Justice de-
termined that the applicability of the word “person” to a corporation did not imply that
the adjective, “personal,” was applicable as well.387 He closed the opinion by opining,
“We trust that AT&T will not take it personally.”388
AT&T seems to stand, if anything, for Chief Justice Roberts’s reluctance to strain
the terminology of previous decisions.389 Unfortunately, what this indicates about his
beliefs about corporations, privacy, prior decisions of the Court, or English etymol-
ogy is unclear. In any case, the tone of the case is at the same time slightly chastis-
ing and bemused, which is unusual for Chief Justice Roberts (who infrequently puns
in his opinions).390
c. Homosexual Marriage
The Chief Justice recently authored a decision for the Court considering Califor-
nia’s Proposition Eight, which defined marriage as between a man and a woman.391
Despite intense public speculation regarding the controversial subject matter,392 the
Chief Justice and the majority decided Hollingsworth v. Perry on an issue of stand-
ing.393 The State of California had refused to defend the constitutional challenge to
Proposition Eight in court, and a group of the ballot’s official proponents had defended
it instead.394 When the District Court declared the proposition unconstitutional, the
proponents appealed to the Ninth Circuit.395 The Supreme Court, however, found
that the proponents did not have standing to appeal because they had not suffered
385 Id. at 1185.
386 Id. at 1182–85.
387 Id. at 1182.
388 Id. at 1185.
389 See generally AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177.
390 This case is also notable for its restriction of privacy. Id. Similarly, the Chief Justice
joined in the majority opinion of a case holding that questions relating to illegal drug use on
a questionnaire required by NASA of government employees did not intrude on any personal
right to privacy as implied by precedent. NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 759 (2011).
391 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
392 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Commentary: What Might Happen?, SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar. 28, 2013, 6:40 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/commentary-what-might
-happen/.
393 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667–68.
394 Id. at 2659–61.
395 Id. at 2660.
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a concrete and particularized injury.396 Although the case was resolved on a proce-
dural issue rather than the merits, the Court’s decision effectively and tacitly affirmed
the right of homosexual couples to marry in California.397
However, the Chief Justice felt differently about the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA).398 Writing in dissent to the majority opinion in United States v. Windsor,
Chief Justice Roberts opined that the Court did not have jurisdiction over the issue and
that the Act was justified by the need for “uniformity and stability.”399 Despite this,
he made it clear that he was not issuing an opinion on the merits or constitutionality
of homosexual marriage in general, stating:
We may in the future have to resolve challenges to state marriage
definitions affecting same-sex couples. That issue, however, is not
before us in this case . . . . I write only to highlight the limits of the
majority’s holding and reasoning today, lest its opinion be taken
to resolve not only a question that I believe is not properly before
us—DOMA’s constitutionality—but also a question that all agree,
and the Court explicitly acknowledges, is not at issue.400
D. Criminal Procedure: The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution
In general, the Chief Justice does not frequently write in areas of criminal proce-
dure and criminal law.401 Generally, other members of the Court author the opinions
that guide Court policy in this area.402 His opinions are therefore only to be garnered
through inference from his position on the majority or dissent. It is possible to con-
clude that he tends to be pro–law enforcement; however, there is nothing in this trend
to suggest a strong preference.403 An exception is the Eighth Amendment, where the
396 Id. at 2667–68.
397 See generally Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652.
398 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
399 Id. at 2696–711.
400 Id. at 2697.
401 This is noteworthy, as the Roberts Court has made several key contributions to search
and seizure doctrine in the areas of warrantless searches incident to arrest and GPS tracking
by law enforcement. See infra Part IV.D.
402 See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.).
403 For instance, Chief Justice Roberts joined in the dissent to the landmark opinion that
held that a child’s age should be considered for purposes of determining custody in context
of Miranda. Id. at 2408–18 (Alito, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts has also joined the
majority in cases that limit the presumption of a right to counsel and allowed violations of
the Sixth Amendment as admissible for impeachment purposes. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129
S. Ct. 2079 (2009); Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009).
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Chief Justice has authored two notable opinions.404 However, far from revealing any
underlying philosophy of criminal justice, both cases seem to be more about issues
of judicial philosophy than criminal law. In keeping with his jurisprudential tenden-
cies, Chief Justice Roberts’s contributions in both instances turn on points of juris-
prudence rather than the merits.405
First, the Chief Justice wrote for a plurality in Baze v. Rees, a 2008 case where two
death row inmates convicted of double homicide challenged the constitutionality of
Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol as cruel and unusual.406 His plurality opinion
was a somewhat dry piece citing to historical precedent, in which he held that the
protocol—used by a majority of states—was not cruel and unusual, nor did the risk
of accidental misapplication make it so.407 To Chief Justice Roberts and the majority,
the case seemed to be more about state sovereignty in applying the death penalty and
judicial restraint when faced with unworkable standards than any issue of morality.408
Conversely, Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment in Graham v. Florida,
a 2010 case holding that the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a non-
homicide juvenile offender violated the Eighth Amendment.409 The Chief Justice wrote
separately to advocate limiting the holding to the facts of the case.410 He disagreed
with the majority’s categorical holding that such a sentence is never warranted, instead
advocating a case-by-case approach on the basis of “narrow proportionality” as set
forth in precedent.411 He then proceeded to apply this precedent, which led him to the
conclusion that the facts in the case at hand were unconstitutional due to a number of
factors, including the diminished culpability of juvenile offenders.412
However, he argued for a more restrained approach than the majority employed.413
Calling the majority decision “unwise,” he referenced specific facts of other “heinous
or grotesque” crimes by juveniles that might warrant such a sentence.414 Similarly, the
Chief Justice joined in dissent to Kennedy v. Louisiana two years earlier, in which the
404 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
405 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036; Baze, 553 U.S. 35.
406 Baze, 553 U.S. at 46.
407 Id. at 62. Chief Justice Roberts’s objective tone in this case may have been due to the di-
vision on the Court—only two Justices failed to write a separate opinion, and only two joined
the plurality rather than the judgment (two dissented). It is worth noting, however, that for
Chief Justice Roberts, this controversial issue was simply a matter of historical precedent. Id.
408 Id. at 106 (“In short, I reject as both unprecedented and unworkable any standard that
would require the courts to weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages of different methods
of execution or of different procedures for implementing a given method of execution.”).
409 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
410 Id. at 2036.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 Id. at 2042.
414 Id. at 2041.
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majority held that the death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed for child
rape.415 That dissent made a similar argument for the necessity of non-categorical
rules416 and may have influenced his line of reasoning in Graham.417
E. Conclusion
The Chief Justice is a reserved decision-maker. His opinions tend to be thoughtful,
balanced, and objective within the bounds of the law. While there are issues on which
he may feel strongly, his first and foremost priority is consistently what he considers
to be proper jurisprudence. His decisions evidence an almost-formulaic adherence to
strict rules of judicial guidance, which he frequently wields in unexpected places or
amidst controversy to resolve difficult fact patterns. In a majority of cases, his opinions
can be categorized as follows:
Roberts’s Rules of Order:
1. Judicial Avoidance: If at all possible, cases must be dismissed on grounds
of standing, mootness, or ripeness. Never rush to make a decision unless
necessary, and avoid the temptation to reinvent extant legal interpreta-
tions of law or precedent.418
2. Judicial Deference: Defer to the separate political branches and elected
officials so long as they operate within constitutional boundaries. The leg-
islature is elected to create the law, for better or for worse. The judiciary’s
role is not activism, nor should it have opinions on those issues before it.
The Court’s role is only to determine legality in context of current law,
regardless of the relative value of potential outcomes.419
3. Narrow Construction: Avoid categorical rules; if a case must be decided,
then limit holdings as much as possible to the facts at hand. If a law is
found to be unacceptable, then every reasonable effort must be made to
preserve the surrounding legislation.420
4. Clarity: If a new standard is defined, then that standard should be clear,
concise, and easily applicable to a very specific set of facts. Any new
standard should avoid confusing conflicts with precedent, and any stan-
dard that is overruled should be replaced with precision rather than gener-
alization. This reinforces the need for judicial deference: to hold a legal
law or policy invalid because it is generally undesirable also violates a
415 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
416 Id.
417 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036–42.
418 See supra Part IV.A.
419 See supra Part IV.B.
420 See supra Part IV.C.1.
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standard of clarity when it fails to provide a detailed replacement policy
based on direct analysis of the governing law.421
If the Chief Justice could be said to have a passion for any area of law, it would
most likely be that of constitutional civil liberties. His opinions in the areas of equal
protection, free speech, and freedom of religion are the least dispassionate of his work,
and they often display moving sentiment about the controversy at hand and insightful
understanding of its individual impact. The ideals of the Constitution seem especially
clear to Chief Justice Roberts in these contexts, and he can be relied upon to defend
those ideals. This personal commitment to and belief in the founding principles as well
as the text of the Constitution act to fuel his nearly unyielding principles of jurispru-
dence. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinions display a seemingly unassailable belief that
the political process will eventually cure all wrongs, even when he openly disagrees
with the wisdom of a given law or decision.422
In general, these are the ideal qualities of a justice of the Court, and in many cases
Chief Justice Roberts has produced considered, articulate opinions guided by these
principles. However, there is another, more unexpected quality which could be attri-
buted to the Chief Justice: that of a thoughtful leader. This is a quality that, if it exists,
has likely evolved over time and can most clearly be seen in NFIB.423 In high profile
cases like NFIB or Baze, where the Court might otherwise have been irreparably
divided, the Chief Justice is found authoring keen majority opinions that bridge the
gap between numerous concurrences and dissents.424 Further, he seems to promote
and respect the abilities and specialties of other Justices, whose majority opinions he
often joins without comment.425
This quality, while perhaps beneficial in the short term, is nonetheless surprising
because it departs from the strict, principle-based jurisprudence and reverence for the
law that Chief Justice Roberts embodies in so many other ways. Regardless of whether
this or some other factor is the motivation behind his outlying opinions, it will likely
seem inadvisable to some to temper judicial decisionmaking with almost any outside
concerns that could so readily lead to a lack of clarity and muddle the precise inter-
pretation of the law for which the Chief Justice strives. Perhaps on balance, the Chief
Justice is comfortable with making such accommodations for the benefit of the Court
as an institution.
421 See supra Part IV.C.1.
422 See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (opining, “Members of this
Court are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor
the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected
leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them. It is not our job to
protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.”).
423 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
424 See id.; Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
425 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
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V. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SAMUEL ALITO:
DECISIONS FROM JANUARY 2006 THROUGH JUNE 2013
The Court provides no cogent explanation why this legislative judg-
ment should be overridden. Conclusory references to “decency,”
“moderation,” “restraint,” “full progress,” and “moral judgment” are
not enough.426
Justice Alito’s opinions are, on the whole, reserved and thorough. He has authored
multiple opinions on points of criminal and civil procedure. He adheres strictly to text-
based analysis and the principles of stare decisis. He moves methodically through
issues in relation to statutory or precedential authority without deviation. However,
underneath the surface of this body of precise work, Justice Alito is a deeply passion-
ate and sometimes scathing advocate for criminal justice. He believes firmly in clearly
delineated rules of broad applicability that law enforcement can consistently apply.427
He does not believe in deviation from precedent or case-by-case criminal procedure.428
He supports the policy decisions of the people and their elected state legislators re-
garding judicial sentencing guidelines, regardless of perceived harshness.429 When
necessary, he invariably upholds stringent sentencing legislation and advocates for
the availability of harsh penalties.430
Justice Alito is reliable and assured. If he strongly disagrees with an opinion, he
can be counted on to argue for his point consistently thereafter. His dissents can be
surprisingly and sometimes wittily worded, but also harshly critical of the Court and
those with whom he disagrees. In matters of criminal justice, his dissents are frequent,
as he advocates a less lenient system than many members of the Court.431 These dis-
sents are sharply worded and bold, frequently looking to the possible detrimental ef-
fects of the decisions he protests or lamenting the Court’s misapplication of precedent.
He moves through these issues with the same methodical, textually based rigidity he
applies to his less controversial opinions, usually justifying his passionate tone with
a more traditional basis in law. Overall, there is a certain dichotomy between the calm,
academic persona displayed in his interview for the Court, in his confirmation hearing,
and found in most of his work, as compared to the fiery, sharp-tongued author of dis-
sents or concurrences such as those found in J.D.B v. North Carolina,432 Montejo v.
Louisiana,433 and Arizona v. Gant.434
426 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 469 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
427 See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
428 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 358–65 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
429 Id.
430 See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 465–66 (Alito, J., dissenting).
431 See, e.g., J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408 (Alito, J., dissenting); Gant, 556 U.S. at 355 (Alito,
J., dissenting).
432 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408 (Alito, J., dissenting).
433 Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2092 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
434 Gant, 556 U.S. at 355 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Although Justice Alito has written numerous opinions for the Court, his most
noteworthy work can be seen in three critical areas of law. First, his most defining
opinions can be found in the area of criminal procedure. He has also written notable
opinions in the area of governmental authority, and finally in the area of civil rights.
Within these opinions, he is primarily guided by three key principles of jurisprudence:
stare decisis, general applicability, and constitutional state sovereignty and separation
of powers.
A. Criminal Procedure: The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution
I can only assume that the dissent thinks that our constitutional pre-
cedents are like certain wines, which are most treasured when they
are neither too young nor too old . . . .435
Justice Alito has been most notably prolific in the area of criminal procedure. He
has authored opinions regarding numerous aspects of criminal law, and many of these
opinions are especially noteworthy. First, he has written regarding the Fourth Amend-
ment in several search and seizure cases. He has also written on the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. Additionally, he has authored opinions in Fifth Amendment due pro-
cess cases, including a recent dissent to the groundbreaking case of J.D.B.436 Finally,
Justice Alito has written several interesting opinions which demonstrate his stance
on criminal punishment in the area of Eighth Amendment issues.
1. The Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure
[T]his test creates a host of uncertainties, and this case illustrates one
of the problems.437
Justice Alito’s passion for criminal justice became apparent within the first several
years of his career on the Court and can very clearly be seen in Gant438 and subsequent
related cases. Gant could be considered as one of the defining cases of Justice Alito’s
Supreme Court career.439 In Gant, the majority overruled New York v. Belton440 in
435 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2093 (Alito, J., concurring).
436 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408 (Alito, J., dissenting).
437 Grooms v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1981, 1981 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
438 See Gant, 556 U.S. at 355–65 (Alito, J., dissenting).
439 Id.; see, e.g., Steven R. Shapiro, ACLU Summary of the 2008 Supreme Court Term,
ACLU (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/organization-news-and-highlights/aclu-summary
-2008-supreme-court-term (discussing Justice Alito’s dissent on overruling Belton).
440 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that a search of a passenger’s jacket located inside a motor
vehicle was constitutionally acceptable as a contemporaneous search incident to the pas-
senger’s arrest).
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favor of a new two-part rule regarding vehicular searches incident to arrest.441 Previ-
ously, police officers were able to contemporaneously search the passenger compart-
ment of an automobile when arresting an occupant of the automobile.442 The majority
in Gant, however, held that, “Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occu-
pant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger com-
partment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest.”443 Justice Alito’s considered and methodical dis-
sent objected to the holding on grounds of reliance, precedent, workability, and bad
reasoning.444 He indicated that the new rule on vehicular searches incident to arrest
was confused and unstable; that there was no reason to overrule a rule that was known
and widely, workably used; and that the respondent had not requested that the Court
overrule Belton.445 Although Justice Alito’s dissent in Gant was composed in a well-
argued, precise, and reasonable tone, he has since demonstrated that he was pro-
foundly dissatisfied with the majority holding.
The decision in Gant did not rest easily with Justice Alito, and he found at least
four more occasions to publicly raise his objections to the ruling.446 Twice in 2009 he
wrote dissents to grants of writ of certiorari to relate the legal issues in question to
Gant.447 In each he remarked that the problems were a direct product of the ruling in
Gant,448 which was too unclear.449 Evidencing his enduring and persistent adherence
to the principles of his judicial philosophy, he summarized with precisely the same
comment in both cases: “As I observed in dissent [to Gant] . . . this test creates a host
of uncertainties, and this case illustrates one of the problems.”450
In 2011, Justice Alito was again given an opportunity to officially revisit Gant
when he authored the majority opinion in Davis v. United States,451 determining that
the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence seized in accordance with current law
before Gant had been decided.452 There, Justice Alito approached the issue with a
441 Gant, 556 U.S. at 358–65 (Alito, J., dissenting).
442 Id. at 340–41 (majority opinion).
443 Id. at 351.
444 Id. at 355–65 (Alito, J., dissenting).
445 Id. at 364–65.
446 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424–25 (2011); Montejo v. Louisiana, 129
S. Ct. 2079, 2092 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring); Megginson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1982
(2009) (Alito, J., dissenting); Grooms v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1981, 1981 (2009) (Alito,
J., dissenting).
447 See Megginson, 129 S. Ct. at 1982; Grooms, 129 S. Ct. at 1981.
448 See Gant, 556 U.S. 332.
449 Megginson, 129 S. Ct. at 1982 (Alito, J., dissenting); Grooms, 129 S. Ct. at 1981 (Alito,
J., dissenting).
450 Megginson, 129 S. Ct. at 1982 (Alito, J., dissenting); Grooms, 129 S. Ct. at 1981 (Alito,
J., dissenting).
451 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
452 Id. at 2424–25.
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far different tone than his opinion in Montejo discussed below.453 He did find cause
to criticize Justice Scalia’s voting record for inconsistency, but otherwise authored
minimal dicta.454 Davis might be seen as a final, vindicating opportunity for Justice
Alito to oppose the ruling in Gant, which he found to be so undesirable.455
In other Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Alito concurred in the judg-
ment to the recent GPS tracker case of United States v. Jones,456 holding that the
warrantless use of a GPS to track and monitor a defendant’s vehicular movements
constituted an unconstitutional search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.457
However, he disagreed with the methodology of the majority, which found the place-
ment of the GPS objectionable because it was a trespass on the defendant’s property,
on the grounds of general applicability and disregard of precedent.458 He felt that the
ruling relied on a rationale long since overruled,459 and was not broadly applicable.460
Instead, Justice Alito thought that the prevailing standard—that of a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy—was adequate to encompass the GPS tracking device placed on
Jones’s car and classify it as an unconstitutional search.461 This opinion is a typical
analysis for Justice Alito based in principles of stare decisis.462 Rather than create
broad new rules, which he repeatedly referenced as unwise and strained, he instead
preferred a methodical, text-based analysis and application of precedent.463
2. The Sixth Amendment: Right to Counsel
Montejo v. Louisiana464 is another defining case for Justice Alito, comparable
to Arizona v. Gant.465 The majority in Montejo overruled precedent, Michigan v.
Jackson,466 by limiting the presumption of the right to counsel during a criminal
453 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2092–94 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring); see
also infra text accompanying notes 468–84.
454 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2093.
455 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2434.
456 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
457 Id. at 945.
458 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957–64 (Alito, J., concurring).
459 He first compared the trespass-based reasoning of the Court to other trespass-based Fourth
Amendment cases superseded by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Jones, 132 S.
Ct. at 957–61 (Alito, J., concurring). He indicated that he felt that the return to this type of
reasoning disregards the functioning precedent and the reasons for its implementation. Id.
460 He noted that property law varies from state to state, and that the new logic did not
extend to prolonged visual surveillance or the burgeoning problem of electronic surveillance
without physical trespass. Id. at 961–62.
461 Id. at 964.
462 Id. at 957–58; see also infra Parts V.A.2–4.
463 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957–61.
464 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
465 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
466 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (holding invalid any waiver of defendant’s
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interrogation.467 Justice Alito joined in the judgment, but wrote an especially scath-
ing concurrence criticizing the Montejo dissenters for supporting the same arguments
they had dismissed when deciding Gant.468 In dissent to Gant, Justice Alito had
strongly objected to the majority decision, citing the interests of law enforcement,
their history of reliance on precedent, and stare decisis.469 The dissenters in Montejo
based their arguments on similar reasoning.470 Because some of the same Justices who
dissented in Montejo had agreed with the majority in Gant,471 Justice Alito took issue
with their arguments in Montejo.472 One of the most memorable quotes in Justice
Alito’s body of work is presented in this context:
The dissent, finally, invokes Jackson’s473 antiquity, stating that “the
23-year existence of a simple bright-line rule” should weigh in
favor of its retention. But in Gant, the Court had no compunction
about casting aside a 28-year-old bright-line rule. I can only as-
sume that the dissent thinks that our constitutional precedents are
like certain wines, which are most treasured when they are neither
too young nor too old, and that Jackson, at 23, is in its prime,
whereas Belton,474 at 28, had turned brownish and vinegary.475
His rationale for concurring with Montejo is similarly telling: he was complying with
the rationale that had become binding precedent in Gant.476
The concurrence in Montejo is easily one of the least academic, yet most passion-
ate, opinions in Justice Alito’s repertoire.477 Based on the principles he advocated in
Gant, it seems more likely he would have resisted overruling precedent in Montejo.478
However, he concurred, basing his concurrence on the manner in which the majority
decided Gant.479
right to counsel at a police-initiated interrogation following defendant’s assertion of his right
to counsel in court).
467 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079.
468 Id. at 2093–94 (Alito, J., concurring).
469 Gant, 556 U.S. at 358–65 (Alito, J., dissenting).
470 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2093 (Alito, J., concurring).
471 See generally Gant, 556 U.S. 332.
472 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2093 (Alito, J., concurring).
473 See generally Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
474 See generally New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
475 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2093 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The rest of the
concurrence is similarly harsh, again criticizing the decision in Gant, as well as criticizing
Justice Scalia’s role in that decision. Id. at 2092–94.
476 Id. at 2092.
477 See id. at 2092–94.
478 See generally Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079; Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 358–65 (2009)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
479 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092 (Alito, J., concurring); see generally Gant, 556 U.S. 332.
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By doing so, Justice Alito merely applied his rule regarding stare decisis, taken
to its logical extreme.480 What other factors affected his decision remain unknown.481
His scathing concurrence to Montejo was certainly uncharacteristically vehement, but
in context of his character, his conclusions do make sense.482 Almost all of Justice
Alito’s opinions work through a given issue on the basis of a thorough examination
of precedent and controlling authority. The Court’s seemingly fickle disregard of
precedent in these instances, such as Gant, must have seemed to him dangerous
judicial overreaching.483
Although Justice Alito’s opinion in Montejo is not one of his most precise works
of legal analysis, it is notable because it demonstrates not only his profound personal
commitment to the issue of criminal justice, but more importantly, it shows his consis-
tent commitment to his principles of jurisprudence (in this case, stare decisis) despite
his personal feelings.484
3. The Fifth Amendment: Due Process and Miranda
Because of the adamant and unrelenting nature of his opinions in every area of
criminal justice, Justice Alito has earned a reputation as a harsh and vocal critic when
he disagrees with the Court.485 In the area of due process, Justice Alito recently strongly
dissented to the groundbreaking decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, in which the
majority introduced a subjective element of analysis—a child’s age—into the formula
for determining custody for purposes of Miranda warnings.486 Previously, law enforce-
ment officials were only required to Mirandize a suspect of any age if an objective
“reasonable person” would have felt himself to be in police custody and unable to
leave at will.487 The majority in J.D.B. held that, “so long as the child’s age was known
to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively appar-
ent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the
objective nature of that test.”488
480 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092–94 (Alito, J., concurring).
481 However, he does state that the decision in Gant supports the treatment of precedent in
Montejo, and he has stated that he disagrees with the decision in Gant. Id.; see generally
Gant, 556 U.S. 332. Whether he intended it to logically follow that Montejo was also poorly
decided is unclear, although if those were truly his thoughts it seems peculiar to vote in
concurrence on that basis. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092–94 (Alito, J., concurring).
482 See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092–94 (Alito, J., concurring).
483 See, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. at 358–65 (Alito, J., dissenting).
484 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092–94 (Alito, J., concurring).
485 See, e.g., Elliot Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Inter-
pretation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983 (2007).
486 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408–18 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
487 Id. at 2397 (majority opinion).
488 Id. at 2406.
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Justice Alito’s primary argument against the holding in J.D.B. revolved around
the clarity and ease of applicability of Miranda v. Arizona489 for law enforcement
officials.490 Although he admitted some margin of error for those who fell outside the
standard of the typical “reasonable person” used for purposes of objectively deter-
mining custody, Justice Alito felt that the margin was anticipated and is acceptable in
exchange for the “one-size-fits-all” element that made Miranda so valuable.491 While
he never explicitly refers to any disrespect for earlier case law, his dissent, like his dis-
sent in Gant,492 stands for the proposition that the majority transformed a clear and
valuable precedent into a highly subjective and confusing new standard of the sort that
Miranda was enacted to overcome.493
J.D.B. was so troubling to Justice Alito because of the implications of such a
subjective standard.494 He wrote his dissent in part to record his fear of a slippery slope
that would inevitably mandate consideration of unknowable factors like intelligence
and education in Miranda analysis.495 Although this is not one of his more ardent
opinions, his tone is far from forgiving and indicates his sincere concerns.496 He opens
by referring to the majority’s opinion as immodest and insensible, but then attends to
his arguments without further ado, primarily centering on the confusing impact of the
case on law enforcement.497 Because of this, J.D.B. most clearly demonstrates Justice
Alito’s concern with clarity and general applicability, another principle that is key
to his jurisprudence.498
4. The Eighth Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Court should not produce a de facto ban on capital punishment by
adopting method-of-execution rules that lead to litigation gridlock.499
Justice Alito is also supportive of constitutional state sovereignty and separation
of powers, and he has been known to approve of the death penalty in extreme cases.500
For instance, he authored a dissent to Kennedy v. Louisiana,501 a case holding that
489 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
490 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408–18 (Alito, J., dissenting).
491 Id. at 2409.
492 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 358 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
493 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2409 (Alito, J., dissenting).
494 Id. at 2414–15.
495 His dissent continued on to predict a flood of litigation attempting to apply the rule
crafted in J.D.B. to a wide array of defendant characteristics. Id.
496 See id. at 2408.
497 Id. at 2408–09.
498 See id. at 2408–18.
499 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 71 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring).
500 Id. at 63.
501 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the death penalty could not constitutionally be applied to perpetrators of child rape.502
He advocated cogently and at length against each of the majority’s arguments, disputing
interpretation of precedent and advocating for the ability of state legislatures to develop
responses to child rape as they found fitting.503 He contended that the Court was sub-
stituting its own judgment for that of the people and the states.504 He also indicated
agreement with the people and the states that some non-homicidal cases are so heinous
that they warrant the death penalty.505 Finally, he primarily argued that the plurality’s
opinion was groundless, stating, “The Court provides no cogent explanation why
this legislative judgment should be overridden. Conclusory references to ‘decency,’
‘moderation,’ ‘restraint,’ ‘full progress,’ and ‘moral judgment’ are not enough.”506
Similarly, Justice Alito joined in part the dissent to Graham v. Florida,507 a 2010
case where a majority of the Court determined that a life sentence without parole was
unconstitutional in the case of juvenile non-homicide offenders.508 Justice Thomas’s
dissent, like Justice Alito’s earlier dissent in Kennedy,509 argued against judicial over-
reaching, opining that non-elected justices of the Court are not uniquely qualified to
undermine a sentencing determination that juries across America regularly impose on
the worst offenders.510 Justice Alito also wrote a terse individual dissent pointing out
that the holding banned only sentences of life without parole,511 and that a sentence
of a term of years without parole would likely technically be acceptable instead (he
specifically proposes a term of forty years without parole for such cases).512
Some critics may say that Justice Alito’s opinion in Kennedy seems, more than
anything, to embody a harsh perspective toward convicted criminals who attempt to
circumvent the system or avoid their punishment, as well as a willingness to construe
criminal-friendly laws creatively to ensure that justice is served.513 However, in joining
the dissent, Justice Alito again demonstrates his deference to the sentencing policy of
the legislature. His own separate writing, pointing out the problems with the majority
reasoning, seems more to embody his disdain for the Court’s second-guessing of state
legislatures and provides a means to enact the legislation at issue in this case.
502 Id. at 446–47 (majority opinion).
503 See id. at 447–70 (Alito, J., dissenting).
504 Id. at 460–61.
505 Id. at 467–69.
506 Id. at 469.
507 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
508 Id. at 2034.
509 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 447–70 (Alito, J., dissenting).
510 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2043–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
511 Id. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting). He also pointed out that the ruling was overbroad and
reached an issue not properly before the Court. Id.
512 Id.
513 See, e.g., J.M. Kirby, Graham, Miller, & The Right to Hope, 15 CUNY L. REV. 149,
161 (2011) (discussing how the system still essentially allows for a term of life).
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By advocating for alternative methods of imposing the (formerly) requisite pun-
ishment for particularly heinous crimes, Justice Alito has made a clear statement that
the Constitution should not be viewed as a free pass for violent criminals. Because
of his reliance on stare decisis, this disregard for the spirit of binding law may seem
unusual. However, upon closer examination, his discussions of precedent and law
usually turn on close scrutiny of the language of law and precedent, rather than the
creators’ intent.514 Thus, his close scrutiny of and conclusion regarding the letter of the
holding in Graham is in keeping with his overall jurisprudence,515 although it might
seem to supporters of the majority opinion to border dangerously on judicial activism.
In context, however, Justice Alito was in fact acting in favor of the state legislators
and electing populace that initially demanded harsh penalties for the worst juvenile
offenders, thus showing his support for both state sovereignty and a separation of
powers.516 Additionally, he acted in keeping with his principles of jurisprudence by
delineating a clear standard based on the letter, rather than the debatable spirit, of the
holding.517 Finally, his dissent in Graham is indicative of a keen understanding of the
effects of crime on victims, which can also be seen in several of his opinions regarding
particularly appalling crimes.518
Justice Alito’s approval in Baze v. Rees of a three-stage lethal injection protocol,
alleged to be unconstitutional, is also typical of his methodical, punishment-oriented
approach to certain areas of criminal justice.519 However, he warned in his concurrence
that courts and legislators should refrain from confusing the issue at hand, the consti-
tutionality of a protocol, with the constitutionality of the death penalty itself.520 He
further wrote to object to the standard proposed by the dissent, which would hold a
protocol unconstitutional if it created an “untoward” risk of pain, as too “vague and
malleable.”521 This argument is typical of Justice Alito’s jurisprudence, where he is
often concerned with a clear, fully defined standard.522
Based on these cases, it becomes apparent that Justice Alito holds a very narrow
view of cruel and unusual punishment in most circumstances, and that his arguments
frequently evidence a victim-centric perspective. In 2011, he demonstrated that the
514 See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058–59 (Alito, J., dissenting).
515 See id.
516 See id. at 2043–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting).
517 See id. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting).
518 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 467 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I have no
doubt that, under the prevailing standards of our society, robbery . . . does not evidence the
same degree of moral depravity as the brutal rape of a young child. Indeed, I have little doubt
that, in the eyes of ordinary Americans, the very worst child rapists—predators who seek out
and inflict serious physical and emotional injury on defenseless young children—are the epit-
ome of moral depravity.”).
519 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 63–71 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring).
520 Id. at 63.
521 Id. at 70–71.
522 See also J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408–18 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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issue of prison reform is no different.523 In Brown v. Plata, the Court upheld a Ninth
Circuit decision releasing 46,000 criminals from prison prematurely in order to rem-
edy a number of prison deficiencies partially attributed to overcrowding.524 Justice
Alito authored an ardent dissent objecting to the ruling on the grounds that it was over-
broad and based on outdated evidence.525 Particularly, he felt that the case, which was
brought on behalf of prisoners with mental health and specialized medical needs, did
not justify the premature release into the public of a broad population of prisoners with-
out those needs.526 Notably, he opined that it seemed implausible that “exam tables
and counter tops cannot properly be disinfected” without the “radical and dangerous
step” of releasing prisoners.527 This is exemplary of Justice Alito’s overall theory of
criminal justice, which is both supportive of law enforcement and unyielding in regard
to punishment once a defendant is properly found guilty of a crime.
B. Government Authority: Articles I, II, and III of the U.S. Constitution
Although Justice Alito is not usually vocal in cases dealing with the branches of
government and their respective powers, he generally joins in decisions based on
principles of deference and separation of powers.528 The most notable opinion he has
written in this area of law primarily considered an issue of precedent rather than any
constitutional concern.529 As such, his work in the area of government authority is
best judged first by consideration of one of his early opinions regarding congressional
authority and the Commerce Clause, and then by his voting record in the areas of
executive and judicial authority.
First, in the area of congressional authority, Justice Alito authored a key opinion
regarding the Commerce Clause when he dissented to United Haulers Association
v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority.530 His primary concern was,
typically, precedent.531 The majority in the case distinguished as acceptable flow-control
ordinances in favor of government from those in favor of private industry (previously
deemed unconstitutional in 1994).532 This case was early in Justice Alito’s career on
the Court,533 and the opinion maintains a very formal, respectful tone with none of
523 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1959–68 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
524 See id. at 1928, 1947 (majority opinion).
525 Id. at 1959–61 (Alito, J., dissenting).
526 Id. at 1962–63.
527 Id. at 1963.
528 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 496 (2008); see also infra note 540 and
accompanying text.
529 See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
356–71 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting).
530 Id.
531 Id.
532 Id. at 347 (majority opinion).
533 The case was decided approximately fifteen months after his confirmation. See id. at
330; Jane Roh, Alito Sworn in as Nation’s 110th Supreme Court Justice, FOX NEWS (Jan. 31,
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the heat of later criminal-justice dissents. He proceeded through his analysis of pre-
cedent in the thorough, methodical manner that is his trademark of review and con-
cluded that it was indistinguishable from the case at hand.534 Because this dissent
was really about his devotion to precedent rather than his analysis of the Commerce
Clause, his opinion should not necessarily be taken as highly indicative of his thoughts
on the Clause.535
Further, Justice Alito’s voting record is generally supportive of executive author-
ity, although he rarely writes on the issue. He joined in both dissents to Boumediene
v. Bush, opposing the grant of additional due process rights to enemy-combatant
detainees.536 He similarly joined in the majority to Munaf v. Geren—denying judicial
relief to U.S. citizens whom the government had scheduled for transfer to Iraqi
custody for trial—which relegated such matters of foreign policy to the executive.537
In both cases, Justice Alito joined in advocating against judicial overreaching, prefer-
ring to entrust the executive with decisions regarding foreign policy.538 In the same
vein, he joined in the majority in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, declaring that Congress cannot restrict the power of the executive
over executive officers by enacting multilevel protections preventing removal of
those officers.539 Medellin v. Texas is the only outlier in these cases, in which Justice
Alito joined the majority in declaring limits on the executive power and reserving the
rights of federal and state courts when necessary.540
C. Civil Rights: The First, Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution
Justice Alito has only written, under curious circumstances, to limit free speech,
not to uphold it.541 He has conversely written to uphold the right to bear arms in one
of the landmark decisions of the Roberts Court.542 What his civil rights opinions
2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/01/31/alito-sworn-in-as-nation-110th-supreme
-court-justice.
534 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 370–71 (Alito, J., dissenting).
535 Id.
536 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 801–26 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at
826–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
537 Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–92 (2009).
538 See id.; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 804 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
539 Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146 (2010).
540 In Medellin, he joined the majority in refusing to give deference to a presidential memo-
randum regarding the decision of the International Court of Justice requiring consular noti-
fication for aliens accused of a crime and determining that state procedural default rules took
precedence. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 496–522 (2008); see supra notes 271–83 and
accompanying text.
541 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
542 McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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mostly seem to indicate is that his views on civil rights are considered in light of appli-
cability and impact rather than pure idealism. That is, when Justice Alito does author
a civil rights opinion, he normally endeavors to protect citizens from being victimized
by what he regards as unlawful conduct.543 He has yet to author an opinion based on
the moral or philosophical impropriety of a fundamental rights issue; those civil rights
issues that draw his attention do so, it appears, because of their potential to avert
violence and crime.
Justice Alito has written most notably in the areas of free speech and association,
and also the right to bear arms. In both cases his arguments generally take a very prac-
tical approach, with an eye toward the decision’s implementation. His arguments also
often evidence a somewhat victim-centric perspective, similar to those seen in his
criminal procedure opinions.544
1. The First Amendment
In order to have a society in which public issues can be openly and
vigorously debated, it is not necessary to allow the brutalization of
innocent victims . . . .545
a. Freedom of Speech
Justice Alito wrote the sole dissent in Snyder v. Phelps,546 in which the Court ex-
tended First Amendment protection to the commentary of religious picketers while
they had picketed near a military funeral.547 The plaintiff in the original case, who had
sued the picketers for intentional infliction of emotional distress, was the father of the
deceased service member for whom the funeral was being held.548 Snyder, like Gant,549
may be one of the most telling cases of Justice Alito’s career—it is certainly one of the
most notable.550 Justice Alito argued that the father of the deceased ought to have been
allowed recovery, as he had suffered precisely the wrongs that the tort was created to
recognize.551 He opined that the speech was private, rather than an issue of public con-
cern, due to the personal nature of the attacks on the deceased’s character, and argued
543 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1229 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
544 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 467 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
545 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
546 Id. at 1222.
547 Id.
548 Id.
549 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
550 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222; see also Robert Barnes, Alito Stands Alone on Supreme
Court’s First Amendment Cases, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2011, 7:36 PM), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/03/AR2011030302920.html.
551 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222.
2014] IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE 707
that the location of the picketers (on a public street) was irrelevant.552 These arguments
are not as concise as some of his other disagreements with the majority, nor are they
founded squarely in precedent.553 Instead, what Justice Alito conveyed most clearly
in his dissent was concern for the victim of what he perceives as an unjust assault:
“Respondents’ outrageous conduct caused petitioner great injury, and the Court now
compounds that injury by depriving petitioner of a judgment that acknowledges the
wrong he suffered.”554
This is very telling in light of Justice Alito’s marked proclivity for criminal jus-
tice as well as his apparent unhappiness with numerous decisions of the Court in that
area.555 It is entirely possible that his strength and interest in criminal justice jurispru-
dence is drawn from a drive to advocate for the victims of crime, and a keen under-
standing of the impact crime has on individuals. In this context, his dissent here is
less surprising—the picketers had committed a “brutal” crime, and a justice-driven
society ought to recognize that.556 The rest of the Court disagreed, emphasizing a
seemingly insurmountable dichotomy of ideal versus impact that surrounds many
of Justice Alito’s other opinions.557
Similarly, Justice Alito concurred in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Associ-
ation,558 a case striking down a law that prohibited that sale of violent video games
to minors,559 but nonetheless wrote separately to voice his concerns about violent video
games from an impact-based perspective.560 Having first advocated for judicial avoid-
ance and the right to free speech,561 Justice Alito expressed concern about the effect
of violence on minors, and the necessity for legislation.562 He noted that the future
holds “games that allow troubled teens to experience in an extraordinarily personal
and vivid way what it would be like to carry out unspeakable acts of violence.”563 He
then went on to indicate that further, more precise legislation may be constitutional
552 Id. at 1227.
553 Id.
554 Id. at 1229.
555 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2092–94 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
556 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1229 (Alito, J., dissenting).
557 Id. at 1220 (majority opinion). Whereby Justice Alito argues for a practical, impact-
based solution against arguments often grounded more in ideal. See, e.g., id. at 1229 (Alito,
J., dissenting).
558 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
559 Id. at 2741–42.
560 Id. at 2742–46 (Alito, J., concurring).
561 First, Justice Alito concurred that the statute was in violation of the First Amendment,
stating that “violent video games” were defined with impermissible and dispositive vagueness
(thus tending to favor censorship). Id. at 2742–43. Second, Justice Alito advocated avoidance,
holding that speculation regarding whether a more specific statute regarding video games
would survive strict scrutiny on the basis of content was unnecessary. Id. at 2746.
562 Id. at 2750.
563 Id.
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and reasonable, thus integrating a case-by-case approach with a concern for the well-
being of minors.564
This precisely mirrors the priorities evidenced elsewhere in Supreme Court juris-
prudence by the Chief Justice and might be successfully applied as a method of analy-
sis when approaching a First Amendment case from Justice Roberts’s perspective.565
However, a case-by-case approach is relatively unusual for Justice Alito, who favors
rules of general applicability—most especially in the context of enforcement concerns.
It may be that he finds the danger of imminent harm to minors to be an exception to this
rule. Some support for this may be found in Morse v. Frederick, where Justice Alito
wrote a concurrence to indicate that he viewed the holding as an extremely limited
one,566 warranted in this case due to the threat of illegal drug use, but not to be inter-
preted as a general rule that allowed public schools to regulate the speech of students.567
b. Freedom of Religion and Assembly
Justice Alito wrote a lengthy and involved dissent to Christian Legal Society of
the University of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, a 2010 case
in which the majority held a law school’s refusal to recognize a local chapter of the
Christian Legal Society, which denied admission to homosexual applicants, to be con-
stitutionally permissible.568 He argued that the “university must maintain strict view-
point neutrality . . . [which] extends to the expression of religious viewpoints,” and
that any restriction on student speech due to the speaker’s religious viewpoint violated
substantial Court precedent to this effect.569 Overall, he found the school’s policy re-
quirements for student organizations (as well as the Court’s affirmation of that policy)
to be contradictory and nonsensical: “In sum, Hastings’ accept-all-comers policy is not
reasonable in light of the stipulated purpose of the RSO forum: to promote a diversity
of viewpoints ‘among’—not within—‘registered student organizations.’”570
564 Id. at 2751.
565 See generally Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729; NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
566 That a public school could restrict a student’s speech advocating illegal drug use, because
it presented a threat to public safety. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito,
J., concurring).
567 He was particularly adamant that the holding not be expanded to include regulation of
speech on issues of political importance, including legalization of medical marijuana. Id.
568 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2994–95 (2010). Justice Alito felt that the Court’s argument, which
rested on the basis of the reasonableness of the school’s non-discrimination policy, violated
the tenets of First Amendment viewpoint neutrality. Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting).
569 Id. at 3009. He also felt that the conduct here was objectionable as discriminatory be-
cause the same policy did not require other student groups to accept members who held con-
tradictory beliefs to the organization. Id. at 3003.
570 Id. at 3016.
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Justice Alito’s dissent in Christian Legal primarily shows concern for the manner
in which the school had dealt with the organization.571 He found the school’s behavior
to be discriminatory in light of how it treated other organizations, and motivated im-
properly by the religious viewpoints of the society.572 He seemed to feel that the
school’s response to the allegations was a contradictory rush to justify regulation that
was constitutionally impermissible, and that the Court’s judgment was fundamentally
inapplicable in practice.573 This is consistent with the guiding principles that can be
seen in much of his jurisprudence: concern for those impacted by illegal actions,
concern about the practical implementation of any given ruling, and strict adherence
to precedent.574
2. The Second Amendment
Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from
ancient times to the present day.575
Justice Alito authored the majority opinion in McDonald v. Chicago,576 the
landmark 2010 opinion that incorporated the Second Amendment right to bear arms
as enforceable against the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.577 Two years prior, the Court had determined that the Second Amend-
ment protects a federal right to possess handguns in District of Columbia v. Heller.578
Nonetheless, the city of Chicago had subsequently chosen to outlaw handguns in the
interests of public safety, arguing that the Second Amendment was not applicable to
the states.579 This case was challenged before the Court in McDonald, after homicide
and criminal gun violence actually rose following the anti-handgun law, and several
571 Id. at 3000–12.
572 Id. at 3003.
573 Id. at 3003–06.
574 Out of similar concern for practicality, Justice Alito authored a separate concurrence
in a recent case which upheld the application of a so-called “ministerial exception” to a “called
teacher” who had ministerial training and approval as well as job-specific training. Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 711, 714 (2012) (Alito,
J., concurring). Justice Alito wanted to be explicit in his understanding that the holding, which
insulated certain religious institutions from discrimination complaints when they dismissed an
employee for reasons based on religious tenets, was applicable to more than just those labeled
“ministers.” Id. at 711. He wanted to ensure that the exception would be applicable to those
who were not labeled minister or who were members of faiths that do not utilize the term,
but who performed similar functions or were similarly entrusted by their institutions. Id. That
is, he advocated a functionally based approach as opposed to a strict “ministers-only” interpre-
tation, so as to ensure that the exception properly protected all religious institutions equally. Id.
575 McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
576 Id. at 3020.
577 Id. at 3026.
578 Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)).
579 Id. at 3026–27.
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citizens wished to exercise their constitutional right to bear handguns in their homes
as a means of self-defense.580 Justice Alito, for the majority, held that the Second
Amendment was applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and thus that the law was unconstitutional.581
The basis for Justice Alito’s argument was, unsurprisingly, the right to self-
defense.582 Notably, he found the violence rate in Chicago to be persuasive.583 Further,
in order to determine that this right was a fundamental one which warranted incor-
poration under the Fourteenth Amendment, he cited numerous examples of violence
throughout American history which justified the founders’ intent that each individual
be able to protect himself from lawlessness.584
Additionally, Justice Alito eschewed any suggestion that the Second Amendment
be subject to unique, “second-class” treatment for public safety or any other reasons.585
Here, he referred to the issue as one of constitutional liberties and fundamental civil
rights; however, the majority of his reasoning and the holding are heavily reliant on
the argument for self-defense.586 From Justice Alito’s perspective, the issue seemed
to be the impact of crime and violence on victims, and the very reasonable constitu-
tional remedy intended to address this issue.587 That is, his was an objective, impact-
based historical analysis which sought to justify the rationale for the right, rather than
a more idealistic approach that focused on the right’s constitutional status and conse-
quent moral and legal relevance.588 Because of this, it seems clear that Justice Alito
may be depended on, within reason, to protect the right to bear arms so long as it has
any relevance to self-defense and violent crime.
D. Conclusion
Justice Alito can be depended on to primarily draw his conclusions on the basis
of three key factors:
1. Does the decision comport with precedent (stare decisis)?589
2. Is the decision a clear standard that is easily applied as a rule of general
applicability?590
3. Is the decision necessary, and does it comport with principles of state
sovereignty and separation of powers?591
580 Id.
581 Id. at 3036–50.
582 Id. at 3036–38.
583 Id. at 3026.
584 Id. at 3036–42.
585 Id. at 3044.
586 Id. at 3036, 3050.
587 See id. at 3036–50.
588 Id.
589 See supra Part V.A.1.
590 See supra Part V.A.4.
591 See supra Part V.B.
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Should a decision meet these criteria first, then he will take into account other criteria
as well as the individual merits. However, many decisions by the Court fail to meet
his standards in at least one of these three manners, which then become the common
denominator for his frequent dissents, especially in the area of criminal justice. He
tends toward a pro-victim and pro-law enforcement perspective, especially in criminal
law, so his analysis is often supported by consideration of the impact any decision may
have on potential victims or society at large.
The majority of Justice Alito’s Supreme Court jurisprudence evidences a thought-
ful and deliberate man who relies heavily on precedent and textual analysis. Justice
Alito could be characterized as resistant to alteration in precedent, most especially
when such a decision seeks to alter an established process that he feels is practically
functional and constitutionally acceptable. He is suspicious of arguments that seek to
reinterpret the plain text of the Constitution or precedent, and most frequently objects
to such interpretations on the grounds of practicality. It might be said that he is op-
posed to fixing well-reasoned judicial precedent that is not broken, especially when it
results in practically effective law enforcement. His primary principles of jurisprudence
seem to advocate first, practical, uniform implementation, and second, an impact-
based consideration of improper conduct in relation to those affected.
Justice Alito is a fierce proponent of criminal justice, which is in keeping with
these principles. He advocates strongly for clear guidance from the Court, which can
be easily understood and put into practice by law enforcement. His opinions often con-
sider the impact of a given ruling on innocent members of society. Several of his opin-
ions mention graphic descriptions of violence and crime, which weigh heavily in favor
of his impact-based analysis, and seem to somewhat justify his extremely practical
concerns about preventing, regulating, and punishing crime.
It might be asserted that Justice Alito errs too far on the side of law enforcement,
or weighs too heavily the impact on the victim of the issues before him.592 It cannot
be denied that his strength and his expertise lie in the area of criminal justice, and he
is genuinely passionate about deciding these issues correctly. But although his opin-
ions become significantly more lively when he speaks of criminal justice, sometimes
perhaps even edging toward indecorum, he rarely abandons a firm grounding in the
law. His firm opinions and beliefs are always reliably based in the very principles of
stare decisis and textual interpretation that guide his innumerable opinions on issues
of procedure or transactional law. His judicial philosophy seeks to benefit the victims
of crime and society as a whole. He does so via the same methodology that has pro-
duced consistent and reliable outcomes in a large and accomplished body of work. His
faithful adherence to the same method of careful analysis ensures that a case’s out-
come is always the result of a considered and principled jurisprudential philosophy.
592 See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Justice Samuel A. Alito’s Lonely War Against Abhorrent, Low-
Value Expression: A Malleable First Amendment Philosophy Privileging Subjective Notions
of Morality and Merit, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115 (2011).
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Overall, Justice Alito clearly believes in the law, and he believes in the benefi-
cial effect of those laws in preventing the harmful impact of criminal behavior. His
opinions are habitually well-reasoned and justified with the law, but what is more
impressive is his commitment to the real world implementation of rulings that will
have a beneficial impact on the protection of the public from crime or imposition on
their rights. Justice Alito stands for considered practicality, a perspective that sharply
distinguishes him from more idealistic, policy-driven members of the Court.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have served on the Supreme Court for
ninety-one and eighty-seven months respectively.593 While these are relatively brief
tenures in a lifetime of service for most justices, there is a sufficient body of work to
assess whether President Bush’s expectations have been realized and to anticipate how
these two men may vote on significant cases in the future.
Judge John Roberts was recommended for appointment based on an extraordinary
intellect and an unassuming personality that made us comfortable he would not abuse
power. President Bush selected Judge Roberts to be Chief because he sensed someone
with the leadership skills necessary to lead the Court and the judiciary, who would
look out for the Constitution, and who would protect the Court as an institution.
Judge Samuel Alito was recommended for appointment based on an unmatched
record of consistent excellence. His dedication to law and to the United States was
evident by his many years of public service. We believed both men had the courage
and discipline to apply a consistent philosophy of judging over the course of a long
judicial career.
On balance, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have “delivered as advertised.”
The Chief Justice has decided cases as an impartial umpire, exercising restraint and
respect for the electoral branches of government. Justice Alito has continued his public
service with distinction and consistency, adhering to a core set of principles. There
have been few instances where these Justices have taken positions inconsistent with
their usual pattern of judging. Over the course of a long career and hundreds of
opinions, it is to be expected that even the most ardent fan of Roberts and Alito will
be disappointed by a decision. However, it is my prediction that history will judge
the appointment of these two men to the Supreme Court as one of the most shining
and enduring legacies of President George W. Bush.
593 Biographies of Current Justices, supra note 12.
